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A NEW SYSTEMATIC EXPLANATION
OF THE TYPES AND MITIGATING EFFECTS
OF EXCULPATORY DEFENSES
Jim Staihar*
When someone performs a criminal act, there is a rebuttable presumption that
she is particularly blameworthy and liable to a particularly severe punishment
for the act. The presumption is rebutted when the criminal actor has an ex-
culpatory defense. Such defenses mitigate how much a criminal actor is blame-
worthy and liable to be punished for her act. In this paper, I begin by spelling
out a taxonomy of the main types of exculpatory defenses. Then I argue that a
restorative signaling theory ofpunitive desert best explains why such defenses
have their mitigating effects. According to the theory, how much someone is
blameworthy and deserves to be punished for performing a criminal act corre-
sponds to the severity of the burdens she is obligated to undertake to restore the
conditions of trust she undermined by performing the act. The theory explains
the mitigating effects of exculpatory defenses by explaining why they mitigate
the severity of burdens that a criminal actor must undertake to fulfll the ob-
ligation of restoration she incurs from performing her act.
I. INTRODUCTION
A crime is a criminal act performed with a criminal state of mind. A
crime's actus reus requirements define a criminal act, and its mens rea re-
quirements define a criminal state of mind. A criminal act is a type of act
*Law and Philosophy Fellow, University of Chicago Law School. For helpful comments
or discussion on these issues, I very much thank Elizabeth Anderson, Stephen Darwall,
Anthony Dillof, Allan Gibbard, Thomas Green, Tom Beauchamp, Aaron Bronfman, Sarah
Buss, Wayne Davis, Ed Curley, David Dick, Lee Fennell, Suzanne Goraj, Steven Kuhn,
Saul Levmore, Eric Lormand, James Mattingly, Richard McAdams, Martha Nussbaum,
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. i2, Number 2, ppS 205-286. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-42o6. © 2009 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights re-
served. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content
through the University of California Press's Rights and Permissions website, http://www.
ucpressjournals.com/reprintlnfo.asp. DOI: to.Is5z5/nclr.zoo9.12.2.2o5.
I 205
HeinOnline  -- 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 205 2009
206 I NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I VOL. 12 I NO. 2 1 SPRING 2009
that standardly poses a high risk of violating the rights of others. A crim-
inal state of mind consists in disrespecting the rights of others.' Such dis-
respect consists in flouting the moral reasons against violating the rights of
others, and flouting such reasons involves responding inappropriately to
them.2 Although a crime is defined as a criminal act performed with a
criminal state of mind, the mere fact that someone performs a criminal act
generates a rebuttable presumption that she' is particularly blameworthy
and liable to a particularly severe punishment for the act. Assuming she re-
ally is so blameworthy, the state would be warranted in blaming her to
that degree. And if she really is liable to such a severe punishment, then the
state has most reason to punish her so severely against her will.' This pre-
sumption is rebutted, though, when the criminal actor has an exculpatory
defense.' Defenses mitigate how much a criminal actor is blameworthy and
Matt Pugsley, Peter Railton, Don Regan, Scott Shapiro, Marry Silverstein, and two anonymous
reviewers for the New Criminal Law Review. For financial support while completing the paper,
I thank the University of Michigan Philosophy Department and Rackham Graduate School,
the John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics at the University of Michigan Law School,
and the University of Chicago Law School.
i. See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 Ethics 36, 40-41 (i977) (describ-
ing the concept of "moral recognition respect" whose denial captures the sense of disre-
spect at issue); Benjamin B. Sendor, Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of Criminal
Conduct, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 707, 720-36 (i99o) (suggesting that disrespect for the
rights of others is standardly constitutive of a crime's mens rea requirements). Throughout
the paper, I focus only on crimes that are mala in se. For discussion on the types of defenses
the state should recognize for crimes that are malaprohibita or strict liability offenses, see
Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime 237-76 (2004) (endorsing a due diligence defense and a
reasonable ignorance of law excuse to such offenses).
2. At one extreme, such an inappropriate response might consist in someone's intend-
ing to do something under conditions in which she believes that doing it would have a
high risk of violating the rights of others, and none of what she believes about the conse-
quences of doing it provides her with any reason to do it.
3. I intend to use personal pronouns, such as "he" or "she," in a gender-neutral sense
throughout the paper.
4. My sense of liability is a demanding one. On this sense, a criminal actor is liable to a
punishment if and only if the state's reasons to impose it on her against her will outweigh the
state's reasons not to. On a less demanding sense, a criminal actor is liable to a punishment
if and only if the state's imposing it on her against her will would not violate her rights. Cf.
Jeff McMahan, The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing, 15 Phil. Issues 386, 386
(zoos) (describing a similarly less demanding sense of liability to harmful treatment).
5. As I use the term, a criminal actor is not necessarily a criminal. A criminal actor is
defined only as someone who performs a criminal act. A criminal is someone who per-
forms a criminal act with a criminal state of mind.
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liable to be punished.6 If a criminal actor has a full defense for her act, she
is not at all blameworthy and is not liable to any punishment for it. If she
has a partial defense for the act, she might be somewhat blameworthy and
liable to some punishment for it, but not as much as presumed.
Although defenses have these mitigating effects, it is not obvious what
qualifies as a defense or why defenses have these effects. In this paper, I have
three objectives. First, I spell out a taxonomy of the main types of defenses.
Second, I explain the mitigating effects of defenses on a criminal actor's lia-
bility to punishment. Third, I explain their mitigating effects on a criminal
actor's blameworthiness. To explain their mitigating effects on how much a
criminal actor is liable to be punished, I initially consider explanations
grounded in the value requirement of my general theory of the justification
of punishment. I argue none succeeds. Next I consider explanations
grounded in the desert requirement of my general theory. I argue that my
restorative signaling theory of punitive desert, RS, best explains them. I then
argue that RS also plausibly explains the mitigating effects of defenses on
how much a criminal actor is blameworthy. Given its explanatory power, I
argue that RS has important implications not only for what should qualify
as a defense but also for the nature and strength of the state's reasons to rec-
ognize defenses as mitigating factors in its punitive policies.
II. PRESUPPOSITIONS
In spelling out the main types of defenses and explaining their mitigating
effects, I make several presuppositions that I assume obtain at the time a
criminal actor is assessed for blameworthiness and liability to punishment.
First, a criminal actor is unavoidably a member of a large community of
persons over which the state governs as their agent. Second, any justifiable
means of reducing the degree of interaction between a criminal actor and
others would unavoidably leave a significant degree of interaction between
them and so would unavoidably leave others significantly vulnerable to
6. Throughout the paper, I use the term "defenses" to refer only to exculpatory de-
fenses. To be concise, I leave the exculpatory qualification implicit. I will not explain why
the state should recognize non-exculpatory defenses, such as diplomatic immunity. For dis-
cussion of non-exculpatory defenses, see Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A
Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 229--32 (1982).
HeinOnline  -- 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 207 2009
208 I NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I VOL. 12 1 NO. 2 1 SPRING 2009
her. Third, there are no extraordinary means of obtaining epistemic access
to a criminal actor's dispositions. So I assume there are no extraordinary
means of obtaining epistemic access to whether she has a particular dis-
position to commit crimes.
I make presuppositions i through 3 because I seek a practical explana-
tion of the mitigating effects of defenses. I seek to explain their mitigating
effects in the actual world given the natural facts that generally character-
ize the unavoidable conditions under which people actually live.
Presuppositions i through 3 are such facts. I leave it an open question
whether the considerations that constitute defenses in the actual world
would also be defenses with the same mitigating effects in other worlds in
which those presuppositions do not obtain.7
Fourth, everyone knows what acts the criminal actor has performed
and not performed, and they know the beliefs, intentions, and motives
with which she performed them. Fifth, everyone knows all the facts about
her physical and psychological capacities. Thus, I assume everyone knows
whether she has the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons
against violating the rights of others. Sixth, everyone forms justified beliefs
about her dispositions on the basis of his knowledge specified in presup-
positions 4 and 5. So if everyone's knowledge of the relevant facts justifies
him in believing that she has a particularly bad disposition to commit
crimes, I assume he justifiably believes that she has such a disposition.
Seventh, everyone responds rationally to his justified beliefs about her dis-
positions. So if others are justified in believing that she has a particularly
bad disposition to commit crimes, and they are rationally required to in-
cur certain costs in response, I assume they incur such costs.
I make presuppositions 4 through 6 because I seek to explain the miti-
gating effects of defenses on the assumption that others fulfill their epis-
temic duties to each other and to the criminal actor before they punish
her. Before they do so, they have a duty to discover that no facts about her
acts or capacities entail that she does not deserve the punishment. They
also have a duty to form justified beliefs about her dispositions to commit
crimes. And when others discover facts that make someone deserving of
punishment, they have a duty to promulgate such facts to those with an
7. Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 157-6 (1971) (developing a theory of distribu-
tive justice with a similarly practical aim and its own presuppositions about the natural
facts under which it applies).
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interest in them but are unaware of them. Presuppositions 4 through 6 en-
tail that others fulfill such duties.
Also I make presuppositions 4 through 7 because I seek to explain the
mitigating effects of defenses on how much a criminal actor is blamewor-
thy and deserves to be punished. Both concepts are plausibly defined con-
ditionally on the assumption that presuppositions 4 through 7 obtain at
the time of assessment. Regarding the concept of blameworthiness, some-
one is particularly blameworthy for an act if and only if she did it, and
others would be warranted in blaming her to this degree for doing it if pre-
suppositions 4 through 7 were to obtain. Regarding the concept of puni-
tive desert, someone deserves a punishment for an act if and only if she
did it, and the state would not violate her rights by imposing the punish-
ment on her against her will for doing it if presuppositions 4 through 7
were to obtain.8 In either case, how much someone is blameworthy or de-
serves to be punished for doing something does not seem to depend es-
sentially on the moral status of blaming or punishing her under less
idealized conditions. For example, whether someone is blameworthy for
doing something does not seem to depend essentially on whether others
would be warranted in blaming her for it under conditions in which (a)
they do not know what she has done or is capable of doing; (b) they have
unjustified beliefs about her dispositions; or (c) they are disposed to re-
spond irrationally to their beliefs about her dispositions.' Similarly, these
less idealized conditions also seem irrelevant to the issue of whether
8. My non-retributive sense of punitive desert is an instance of J.L.A. Garcia's more
general conception of "negative desert" in Two Concepts of Desert, 5 Law & Phil. 219
(1986). According to Garcia, the point of claiming that someone deserves something harm-
ful to her is not to claim that there would be anything good about imposing it on her.
There might not be. According to Garcia, the point is merely to claim that imposing it on
her against her will would not violate her rights. On a retributive sense of punitive desert,
though, the point of claiming that someone deserves to be punished is precisely to claim
that punishing her would be intrinsically good. See Michael S. Moore, Justifying
Retributivism, 27 Isr. L. Rev. I5, 19-20 (1993); cf. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica 82, 262-65
(Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993) (claiming that the organic whole of a criminal's suf-
fering some punishment is better than the organic whole of her suffering no punishment).
Because I eschew the retributive sense, I am not committed to retributivism by claiming
that criminals deserve to be punished.
9. Cf. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, Sentiment and Value, iso Ethics 722, 745
(2000) (noting that whether someone is warranted in feeling a particular emotion, such as
blame, toward something depends on what she has evidence for believing about it).
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someone deserves to be punished for doing something. So to explain the
mitigating effects of defenses on how much a criminal actor is blamewor-
thy and deserves to be punished, we should assume presuppositions 4
through 7 obtain at the time of assessment.
III. A TAXONOMY OF DEFENSES
To explain the mitigating effects of defenses, we should understand the
main types of them. We can usefully begin by describing three general
types along with justifications.
A. Type 1 Defenses
When someone performs a criminal act, there is a presumption that in
performing it, she manifested a particularly bad degree of disrespect to-
ward the rights of others. The presumed degree of disrespect corresponds
to how badly she presumably flouted the moral reasons against violating
their rights. How badly she presumably flouted such reasons corresponds
to how inappropriately she presumably responded to them. In general,
how inappropriately she presumably responded to such reasons depends
on the beliefs, intentions, and motives with which she presumably per-
formed the act. More precisely, how inappropriately she presumably re-
sponded to them depends on (a) what she presumably intended in
performing the act, (b) what presumably motivated her to intend to per-
form the act, (c) how strongly she was presumably motivated to intend to
perform the act, and (d) the relative strength of the reasons that she pre-
sumably had for and against intending to perform the act. What reasons
she presumably had for and against intending to perform the act depends
on what she presumably believed when she performed it.
Thus, a reason is meant here in a subjective sense that is relative to what
the criminal actor believed when she performed the act. In this sense, the
reasons she had for and against intending to perform the act were pro-
vided by what she believed when she performed it.'" So in this sense, the
0o. In an objective sense, someone's reasons for and against intending to perform an act
are not relative to what she believes. They are provided by facts that are true independently
of what she believes. See Derek Parfit, Rationality and Reasons, in Exploring Practical
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fact that someone believes that her performing a particular act would di-
rectly cause another to die against his will provides her with a strong moral
reason against intending to do it. This fact provides her with such a rea-
son even if her belief is false, or she believes that it does not provide her
with such a reason. Hence, if she were to intend to perform the act with-
out believing it would have any consequences that would count in favor
of it, she would flout very badly the moral reasons against violating the
putative victim's right not to be killed. Therefore, she would disrespect
very badly his right not to be killed.
Given the degree of disrespect that someone presumably manifested in
performing a criminal act, type i defenses are considerations that mitigate
how badly she actually disrespected the rights of others in performing it."
In other words, they mitigate how badly she actually flouted the moral
reasons against violating the rights of others in performing the act. They
mitigate how inappropriately she actually responded to such reasons in
performing it. If a criminal actor has a full type i defense, she did not dis-
respect the rights of others at all in performing her act.' 2 If she has a par-
tial type i defense, she might have disrespected the rights of others to some
degree, but she did not disrespect them as badly as presumed.
Philosophy: From Action to Values 17, 17 (Dan Egonsson, Jonas Josefsson, Bjorn Petersson,
& Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen eds., 2001) (noting the objective sense of reasons). Although
they are conceptually distinct, subjective and objective reasons are related. A fact provides
someone with an objective reason if and only if her believing that it obtains would provide
her with a subjective reason.
To keep matters simple, I set aside for further analysis the issue of whether someone's
beliefs must be justified for them to provide her with a subjective reason for or against in-
tending to perform an act. Similarly, I set aside for further analysis the issue of whether the
subjective reasons that someone had for and against intending to perform an act were pro-
vided not by what she believed when she performed the act, but more precisely, by the con-
siderations that provided her with evidence to believe or not to believe certain propositions
when she performed the act.
iI. See T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 279-80 (1998) (noting this type of
defense); RE Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in Freedom and Resentment and Other
Essays 7-8 (1974) (same); Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations
on a Strawsonian Theme, in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility i19, 123 (John Martin
Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993) (same); cf. John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 575 (1998) (endorsing excuses which entail that in performing her act, the
criminal actor satisfied the standards of character governing her role at the time of the act).
12. More precisely, if a criminal actor has a full type 1 defense, she did not disrespect
the rights of others to any significant degree in performing her act.
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Many different considerations can provide a criminal actor with a type
i defense. For example, she can have a type i defense of compulsion be-
cause she was caused to perform the act against her will by mere force.'"
The compulsion might have been external or internal. To illustrate a case
of external compulsion, suppose a group seizes my arm and although I try
to resist, they use my arm against my will to strike another person. To il-
lustrate a case of internal compulsion, suppose I suffer a seizure that also
causes my arm to strike the victim against my will. In both cases, I have a
type i defense of compulsion for striking the victim. In neither case did I
intend to do anything that I believed had a high risk of striking him or
harming him in any way. In the former, I intended not to strike him or
harm him in any way, and in the latter, not only did I lack the capacity to
form any intentions at all, I also had no beliefs about what I was doing.
So in striking the victim, I did not respond inappropriately to the moral
reasons against violating his rights, specifically his right not to be as-
saulted. Thus, I did not disrespect his rights in striking him.
For another example, a criminal actor can have a type i defense of ig-
norance or mistake of fact because she did not believe her act would have
the type of consequences that make it a criminal act. 4 In other words, she
did not believe her act would have the type of consequences that stan-
dardly pose a high risk of violating the rights of others. To illustrate, sup-
pose I am target shooting with a friend. I shoot at the target believing
there is no chance the bullet will harm anyone in any way. However, the
bullet ricochets off the target and into my friend, causing him to die. In
this case, I have a type i defense of ignorance or mistake of fact for killing
him. Although I intended to do something that subsequently caused him
to die, I did not believe that doing it would cause him to die or harm him
13. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics iiioai-5 (Terence Irwin trans., 2d ed. 1999) (de-
scribing defenses of compulsion). Strictly speaking, an act is intended, under some de-
scription. See Donald Davidson, Agency, in Essays on Actions and Events 43, 46 (i98o);
Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason 119-22 (1987). However, when
someone is caused to perform a criminal act against her will by mere force, she does not
intend to do it, under any description. So as I use the term, criminal acts are, strictly speak-
ing, merely putative acts.
14. See Aristotle, supra note 13, at iiioblg-illa2i (describing defenses of ignorance or mis-
take of fact). To keep matters simple, I set aside for further analysis the issue of whether the
mistake or ignorance must be justified or reasonable to constitute a defense. See supra note to.
For discussion on this issue, see Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 237-64 (20o5).
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in any way. So in killing my friend, I did not respond inappropriately to
the moral reasons against violating his rights, specifically his right not to
be killed. Hence, I did not disrespect his rights in killing him.
For another example, a criminal actor can have a type i defense of
countervailing considerations because, although she knew the act was a
criminal one, she was appropriately motivated to perform it by her belief
that particular considerations obtained which (a) entailed that her per-
forming it would not violate the rights of others or (b) provided her with
most reason to perform it.'5 Such an example might involve consent, self-
defense, defense of others, duress, or necessity. To illustrate a case of de-
fense of others, suppose I know that an assailant will wrongfully kill a
group of innocent people unless I kill him first. As a consequence, he lacks
a right against my killing him. In response, I kill him for the purpose of
preventing him from killing the others. In this case, I have a type i defense
of defense of others for killing him. Although I intended to kill him, I was
appropriately motivated to do so by my belief that some consideration ob-
tained which entailed that he lacked a right against my killing him. So in
killing him, I did not disrespect his rights.
To illustrate a case of necessity, suppose I know that I will starve to
death unless I steal some food from the surplus of another. As a conse-
quence, I have most reason to steal the food even though I know that by
doing so I would violate the other's property right to the food.'6 In re-
sponse, I steal it for the purpose saving my life. In this case, I have a type
i defense of necessity for stealing the food. Although I intended to steal it,
I was appropriately motivated to do so by my belief that some considera-
tion obtained which provided me with most reason to steal it. So in steal-
ing the food, I did not respond inappropriately to the moral reasons
against violating the other's property right to it, even though I knew I vi-
olated this right by stealing it. For in this case, those reasons were out-
weighed by the reasons in favor of violating his property right to the
15. See Aristotle, supra note 13, at IIiOa5-IIOa22 (describing defenses of countervailing
considerations). Again, to keep matters simple, I set aside for further analysis the issue of
whether the belief must be justified for it to provide the criminal actor with a defense. See
supra notes io, 14.
i6. Although I assume stealing the food in this context would violate the other's prop-
erty right to it, there is controversy over whether his property right to the food would ex-
tend to such a case. I assume it would, in part, because by taking the food I presumably
incur an obligation to compensate him for the loss.
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food, namely the reasons for saving my life. Therefore, I did not disrespect
his property right to the food in stealing it.
To clarify, type i defenses of countervailing considerations have a mo-
tivation requirement: countervailing considerations constitute a type i de-
fense only if the criminal actor was appropriately motivated by them in
performing her act.'7 Thus, the mere fact that a criminal actor believed
such considerations obtained when performing her act does not provide
her with a type i defense for the act. Such considerations provide her with
a type i defense only if she not only believed they obtained, but also was
appropriately motivated by this belief in performing the act, such that if
she had not believed they obtained, then she would not have been moti-
vated as strongly to perform it.'"
To illustrate the motivation requirement, consider an apparent case of
defense of others. Suppose a misanthrope embarks on a killing spree
merely because she enjoys killing others and has no regard for their rights.
On her spree, she sees someone aim a gun at five innocent persons. She
knows he will wrongfully kill the five unless she kills him first with her
own gun. She then kills him not because she believes that doing so is nec-
essary to prevent him from killing the five, but merely because she would
enjoy killing him and has no regard for his rights. Her belief that killing
him was necessary to prevent him from killing the five did not play any
role in motivating her to kill him. She would have been motivated to kill
him just as strongly even if she did not have this belief. As evidence that
she was not motivated by this belief, we might suppose that she tried to
kill the other five immediately after killing the one. In this case, she does
not have a type i defense of defense of others for killing him. Although she
17. See John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in Harm and Culpability 103, 105
(A.P. Simester & A.TH. Smith eds., 1996) (endorsing a motivation requirement on de-
fenses of countervailing considerations); Tadros, supra note 14, at 273-8o (same); Marcia
Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 387, 392-93 (2oo5) (same).
i8. The motivation requirement on type i defenses of countervailing considerations is
analogous to a requirement on justified or well-founded beliefs in epistemology: someone's
belief is justified or well-founded only if she not only has evidence that supports her belief,
but also holds the belief on the basis of her evidence that supports it. See Earl Conee &
Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology 92-93 (2004); cf. Hilary
Kornblith, Beyond Foundationalism and the Coherence Theory, 77 J. Phil. 597, 6oi-o2
(1980); Alvin I. Goldman, What Is Justified Belief?, in Justification and Knowledge i, 8-9
(George S. Pappas ed., 1979).
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believed that killing him was necessary to prevent him from killing the
five, she was not motivated by this belief in killing him; she was motivated
only by her desire for pleasure. So she disrespected his right not to be
killed merely to promote her own pleasure.
Although a criminal actor must have been appropriately motivated by
countervailing considerations in order for them to provide her with a
type i defense, her motivation need not have been perfectly virtuous. The
motivation requirement requires only an appropriate regard for the rights
of others. To illustrate, consider again the misanthrope, except suppose
she is appropriately motivated by the rights of others. She still enjoys
killing others; however, she is motivated to do so only under conditions
in which doing so would not violate their rights. So suppose again that
the misanthrope kills the one under conditions in which she knows that
he would kill the other five unless she kills him first. In this case, though,
she kills him not merely because she enjoys doing so, but also because she
believes that doing so would not violate his rights since killing him is
necessary to prevent him from killing the others. In this case, she has a
full type i defense of defense of others for killing him because she was ap-
propriately motivated by her belief that killing him was necessary to pre-
vent him from killing the others, such that if she had not held this belief,
then she would not have been motivated to kill him. She has such a de-
fense for killing him even though her motivation was not perfectly virtu-
ous given that she was motivated in part to kill him to promote her own
pleasure. However, she did not kill him merely to promote her own pleas-
ure: her motivation was constrained by an appropriate regard for his
rights. Because she appropriately regarded his rights in killing him, she
did not disrespect his rights in doing so.
Critics might argue that type i defenses of countervailing considera-
tions do not have a motivation requirement.' 9 They might contend that a
criminal actor's having any regard for the rights of others is not a neces-
sary condition of her having such a defense. According to them, the mere
fact that the criminal actor believed certain countervailing considerations
obtained when she performed her act can be sufficient to provide her with
a defense for the act no matter what her motivations for performing it. For
in such a case, her act might have been optimific in both a subjective and
i9. I refer in general to "critics" as a means of anticipating possible objections to my
claims. I do not assume actual writers have raised the objections I discuss.
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objective sense no matter what her motivations for performing it. It might
have been subjectively optimific in the sense that its expected value might
have been at least as high as the expected value of any other act then avail-
able to her. It might have been objectively optimific in the sense that its
actual consequences might have been at least as good as the consequences
of any other acts then available to her.2" Assuming her act was optimific in
both senses, she has a defense for the act no matter what her motivations
for performing it. For if others were to express any blame toward her for
the act, they would deter her and others from performing similar optimific
acts in the future. Hence, expressing any blame toward her for the act
would not itself be optimific. So she would not be blameworthy for the act.
To illustrate, consider again the first case of the misanthrope who has
no regard for the rights of others. Although her trying to kill the innocent
five was not optimific, her killing the one was optimific because she knew
that killing him was necessary to prevent him from killing the others.
Because her killing him was optimific, she has a type i defense of defense
of others for doing so even though she did so with no regard for his rights,
as she killed him merely to promote her own pleasure. If others were to
express any blame toward her for killing him, they would deter her and
others from performing similar optimific acts in the future. For example,
they would deter misanthropes generally from killing aggressors under
conditions in which doing so is necessary to prevent the aggressors from
killing many others. Hence, expressing any blame toward the misanthrope
for killing the victim would not itself be optimific. So she is not blame-
worthy for killing him.
In response, the critics have not proven that type i defenses of counter-
vailing considerations do not have a motivation requirement. Their argu-
ment is unpersuasive for at least three reasons. First, the critics assume that
a criminal act might be optimific even if it is performed with no regard for
the rights of others. But in the standard case, a criminal act would not be
optimific if it were performed with no such regard. Whether an act is opti-
mific depends on the value or expected value of its consequences. The value
or expected value of an act's consequences depends on not only the value of
its further causal consequences, but also the value of the act itself and the
2o. Unless I note otherwise, I use the term "optimific" to connote both its subjective
and objective senses.
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motives with which it is performed.2" If a criminal actor performs her act
with no regard for the rights of others, then she performs it with a morally
deficient motivation that is worse than the motivation with which she
would have performed it if she had performed it with the appropriate regard
for the rights of others. So in the standard case, a criminal act performed
with no regard for the rights of others would not be optimific because the
value or expected value of its consequences would have been higher if it had
been performed with the appropriate regard for the rights of others.
Second, if a criminal actor believes that certain countervailing consid-
erations obtain when performing her act, the critics assume that express-
ing blame toward her for the act would not be optimific even if she
performed it with no regard for the rights of others. They assume that ex-
pressing such blame would deter her and others from performing other
acts in the future that would be optimific at least considered independ-
ently of the motives with which they would be performed. But even if ex-
pressing such blame would deter others from performing some optimific
acts in the future, the expression might still be optimific. For the expres-
sion might have some sufficiently valuable consequences that would not
obtain in its absence. For example, the expression might deter the per-
formance of not only some optimific criminal acts, but also some non-
optimific criminal acts. For another example, the expression might
encourage some to develop an appropriate regard for the rights of others.
As a consequence, the expression might result in not only fewer optimific
criminal acts, but also fewer non-optimific criminal acts. Assuming the
non-optimific acts prevented are sufficiently bad and numerous relative to
the optimific acts deterred, the expression might be optimific.
Third, the critics assume that if expressing blame toward a criminal ac-
tor for her act would not be optimific, then she is not blameworthy for the
act. But whether the expression would be optimific is not relevant to
whether she is blameworthy. She is blameworthy for the act if and only if
others would be warranted in blaming her for the act under certain ideal-
ized conditions. 22 And others' blaming her for the act would consist in
21. See G.E. Moore, supra note 8, at 198-99; William Shaw, The Consequentialist
Perspective, in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory 5, 6-7 Uames Dreier ed., 2oo6);
Tadros, supra note 14, at 278-79.
22. The idealized conditions plausibly include the satisfaction of my presuppositions 4
through 7. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
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their feeling an attitude of moral blame toward her for the act. Such an at-
titude might consist in resentment or indignation.23 So she is blamewor-
thy for the act if and only if others would be warranted in feeling an
attitude of moral blame toward her for the act under certain idealized con-
ditions. But others' feeling an attitude of moral blame toward her does not
necessarily involve their expressing the attitude. They might feel such an
attitude without expressing it. Thus, the issue of whether they would be
warranted in feeling such an attitude is distinct from the issue of whether
they would be warranted in expressing it. They might be warranted in
feeling such an attitude even if they are not warranted in expressing it.24
As a consequence, even if others would not be warranted in expressing an
attitude of moral blame toward a criminal actor for her act because the ex-
pression would not be optimific, the criminal actor might still be blame-
worthy for the act.
The critics might concede that someone is blameworthy if and only if
others would be warranted in feeling an attitude of moral blame toward her.
But they might contend that others are warranted in feeling an attitude of
moral blame toward someone if and only if feeling such an attitude toward
her would be optimific. And they might contend that others would feel an
attitude of moral blame toward someone only if they would also express it
toward her. For they might contend that it is psychologically impossible to
feel an attitude of moral blame toward someone without expressing it to-
ward her.2 ' As a consequence, feeling an attitude of moral blame toward
someone would be optimific only if expressing the attitude toward her
would be optimific. So feeling an attitude of moral blame toward someone
would be warranted only if expressing the attitude toward her would be op-
timific. Thus, assuming it would not be optimific to express an attitude of
moral blame toward someone, others would not be warranted in feeling
such an attitude toward her, and so she would not be blameworthy.
The critics' response is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, we
can plausibly deny that it is psychologically impossible to feel an attitude
23. See, e.g., Strawson, supra note ii, at 13-15.
24. See Scanlon, supra note it, at 269.
25. Cf. Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson, The Moralistic Fallacy: On the
"Appropriateness" of Emotions, 61 Phil. & Phenomenological Res. 65, 77 (2000) (stating
that "[i]n normal human psychology.., the relationship between feeling an emotion and
expressing it . . . is exceedingly tight").
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of moral blame without expressing it. We can concede that others gen-
erally have a motivational tendency to express their attitudes of moral
blame. So we can concede that it might be difficult for others to restrain
themselves from expressing such attitudes. But this does not entail that it
is psychologically impossible to do so: it entails only that a concerted effort
is required to do so. Assuming others can feel an attitude of moral blame
without expressing the attitude, it might be optimific for them to feel the
attitude even if it would not be optimific for them to express the attitude.
Second, suppose for the sake of argument that an attitude of moral
blame is not optimific. More generally, suppose for the sake of argument
that it would not be optimific to feel an attitude of moral blame toward a
criminal actor who performed her act with no regard for the rights of oth-
ers but nevertheless believed certain countervailing considerations ob-
tained when she performed it. Contrary to the critics, the attitude might
still be warranted, and so the criminal actor might still be blameworthy for
the act. For many of the considerations that bear on whether an attitude
of moral blame is optimific are irrelevant to whether the attitude is war-
ranted. Whether the attitude is optimific depends on the value of all the
consequences of feeling the attitude. But whether the attitude is warranted
depends on a distinct and narrower set of considerations.26 In general,
whether an attitude of moral blame toward someone for performing an act
is warranted depends only on three considerations. First, it depends on
what the assessor is justified in believing about the external and internal
facts about the act itself, including the external and psychological causes
of the act and its consequences. Second, it depends on what the assessor is
justified in believing about the actor's capacities. Third, it depends on the
content of the attitude itself, and what the assessor is justified in believing
about her relation to the actor.27 Thus, the consequences of having or not
z6. For discussion on the problem of identifying the considerations that are relevant to
whether an attitude of moral blame is warranted or, in other words, fitting or rational, see,
e.g., D'Arms & Jacobson, supra note 9; D'Arms & Jacobson, supra note 25; Stephen
Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability 15-17
(2oo6); Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 36-40 (i99o); Parfit, supra note so;
Wiodek Rabinowicz & Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting
Pro-Attitudes and Value, 114 Ethics 397 (2004).
27. For example, suppose a criminal actor performs an act in which she disrespects the
rights of a particular victim. Other things being equal, only the criminal actor is warranted
in feeling guilty toward herself for the act, given that guilt is a self-reactive attitude. Only
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having the attitude are irrelevant to whether it is warranted. Because the
value of such consequences does bear on whether the attitude is optimific,
the attitude might be warranted even if it is not optimific, and vice versa.
To illustrate the first possibility, suppose a criminal actor assaults me
without any defense. She then threatens to assault me again if I feel any
resentment toward her for assaulting me. We might suppose that if I were
to resent her, I would evince some sign of the resentment such that she
would know I were feeling it, and she would assault me as a consequence.
Given the threat, we might suppose that my resenting her for assaulting
me would not be optimific. Being assaulted again would make the conse-
quences of my feeling the resentment all things considered worse than the
consequences of my not feeling it. So assuming the resentment would not
be optimific, I might be warranted in desiring not to feel it and in under-
taking a process of getting myself not to feel it. 8 But even if the resent-
ment would not be optimific, it might still be warranted. For the
consequences of my resenting her for assaulting me are irrelevant to
whether the resentment would be warranted. Because she disrespected my
rights in assaulting me, I am presumably warranted in resenting her for as-
saulting me. So she might be blameworthy for assaulting me even if blam-
ing her for it would not be optimific.
To illustrate the second possibility, suppose someone performs a
supererogatory act of donating to charity. A criminal actor then threatens
to assault me and the donor if I do not feel an attitude of indignation to-
ward the donor for giving to charity. Given the threat, we might suppose
that my indignation toward the donor would be optimific. My and the
donor's being assaulted would make the consequences of my not feeling
the indignation all things considered worse than the consequences of my
feeling it. So assuming the indignation would be optimific, I might be
warranted in desiring to feel the indignation and in undertaking a process
of getting myself to feel it. But even if the indignation would be optimific,
the victim is warranted in feeling resentment toward the criminal actor for the act, given
that resentment is a personal reactive attitude. And anyone is warranted in feeling indig-
nation toward the criminal actor for the act, given that indignation is an impersonal reac-
tive attitude. See Strawson, supra note is, 13-15 (discussing the types of reactive attitudes
and their relations to each other).
28. See Gibbard, supra note 26, at 37 (distinguishing the issue of whether an attitude is
rational from the issue of whether desiring the attitude is rational, and noting that a per-
son can rationally desire not to have a rational attitude); Parfit, supra note io, at 27 (same).
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it would not be warranted. For the consequences of my not feeling the in-
dignation are irrelevant to whether it would be warranted. Because the
donor did not disrespect anyone's rights in giving to charity, I would not
be warranted in feeling indignation toward her for giving to charity. So the
donor would not be blameworthy for giving to charity even if blaming her
for it would be optimific.
In summary, the critics have not proven that type i defenses of coun-
tervailing considerations do not have a motivation requirement. On the
contrary, they do. If a criminal actor merely believed that countervailing
considerations obtained when she performed her act but was not appro-
priately motivated by them, then she disrespected the rights of others in
performing the act. Other things being equal, someone's disrespecting the
rights of others in performing an act makes her blameworthy for the act
even if blaming her for it would not be optimific.
Although type i defenses of countervailing considerations have a mo-
tivation requirement, a caveat is in order. In practice, it is standardly
very difficult to determine whether the required motivation obtained.
To avoid wrongly denying a criminal actor a defense, the state should
recognize a strong presumption that a criminal actor had the required
motivation if she believed countervailing considerations obtained at the
time of her act. So the state should recognize a strong presumption that
the criminal actor did not disrespect the rights of others if she believed
countervailing considerations obtained at the time of her act. The pre-
sumption should be overridden only when the state meets a high burden
of proof in demonstrating that the presumption is not satisfied. As a
consequence, the motivation requirement might not have significant
bite in practice.
B. Justifications
Justifications are a subset of type i defenses. They are distinct from other
type i defenses in that they apply only to criminal acts that were intended
under some description.29 More precisely, justifications apply only to the
specific intention that a criminal actor had to perform her act. To claim
that a criminal actor has a justification for her act is elliptical for claiming
29. See supra note 13.
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that she has a justification for the intention she had to perform it.3 0 Like the
presumptions generated by a criminal act itself, the intention of a crimi-
nal actor generates similar presumptions regarding how much she is
blameworthy and liable to punishment for the intention. In particular, the
intention of a criminal actor generates similar presumptions regarding
how badly she disrespected the rights of others in having the intention. As
type i defenses, justifications are considerations that mitigate how much a
criminal actor is blameworthy and liable to punishment for intending to
perform her act by mitigating how badly she actually disrespected the
rights of others in intending to perform the act.
Justifications can be subjective or objective. A criminal actor has a sub-
jective justification for her intention if and only if she has a type i defense
for it. A criminal actor has an objective justification for her intention if
and only if she has an indefeasible type i defense for it. She has an inde-
feasible type i defense for the intention if and only if she actually has this
type i defense for the intention, and she would have had this defense for
the intention even if she had the intention under conditions in which (a)
she knew all the facts and (b) other things were equal. Objective justifica-
tions are a subset of subjective ones. Objective justifications are distinct
from other subjective ones in that objective justifications are partly defined
in terms of what the criminal actor would have believed if she knew all the
facts, whereas subjective justifications are defined only in terms of what the
criminal actor actually believed when intending to perform her act.
Both subjective and objective justifications can be full or partial. A
criminal actor has a full (or partial) subjective justification for her inten-
tion if and only if she has a full (or partial) type i defense for it. A crimi-
nal actor has a full (or partial) objective justification for her intention if
and only if she has a full (or partial) indefeasible type i defense for it. And
she has a full (or partial) indefeasible type i defense for the intention if and
only if she actually has a full (or partial) type i defense for the intention,
and she would have had this full (or partial) type i defense for the inten-
tion even if she had the intention under conditions in which (a) she knew
all the facts and (b) other things were equal.
30. I do not assume the intention a criminal actor had to perform her act was an in-
tention to perform the act under its description as a criminal act. I merely assume it was
an intention to do something whose actual consequences made it a criminal act.
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To illustrate the distinction between justifications and other type i de-
fenses, consider again the cases of external and internal compulsion. In
both cases, I strike another person. In the one, I do so merely because a
group seizes my arm and uses it against my will to strike the victim. In the
other, I do so merely because I suffer a seizure that causes my arm to strike
him. In both cases, I have a type i defense of compulsion for striking the
victim because I did not disrespect the rights of others in doing so.
However, in neither case do I have a justification. For in neither case do I
perform the act intentionally. So in neither case do I intend to do anything
for which I could have a justification. Thus, justifications do not include
type i defenses of compulsion although they do include type i defenses of
ignorance or mistake of fact and countervailing considerations.
To illustrate the distinction between objective and mere subjective
justifications, consider two cases of self-defense. In the first, suppose I
see two persons load guns and aim them at me as if they are going to
shoot me to death. In response, I believe they will kill me unless I pre-
vent them from shooting. I also believe I would prevent them from
shooting me by shooting them to death first with my own gun. There
are no other ways I believe I could prevent their killing me. To prevent
their killing me, I intend to kill them, which I then do. Assuming my
beliefs were true, and there was no less harmful way that I could have
prevented their killing me, I have both a subjective and an objective jus-
tification of self-defense for intending to kill them. For given my actual
beliefs and motive, I actually have a type i defense of self-defense for the
intention. And this defense is indefeasible because I would have had this
defense for intending to kill them even if I had intended to kill them un-
der conditions in which (a) I knew all the facts and (b) all other things
were equal.
The second case is the same as the first except, unknown to me, the two
persons load their guns only with blanks and so are not an objective threat
to me. In this case, I still have a subjective justification of self-defense for
intending to kill them. For given my actual beliefs and motive, I still ac-
tually have a type i defense of self-defense for the intention. But I no
longer have an objective justification of self-defense for the intention be-
cause my defense of self-defense is not indefeasible: I would not have had
this defense for intending to kill them if I had intended to kill them un-
der conditions in which (a) I knew all the facts and (b) all other things
were equal. For if I had known all the facts, I would have known they
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posed no threat to me. So by intending to kill them, I would have disre-
spected their right not to be killed.
Given my conception of justifications, we can see where it stands on
seven potentially controversial issues about how we should understand
them. First, the mere fact that a criminal actor has both no false beliefs and
a type i defense for intending to perform her act does not provide her with
an objective justification for her intention. To illustrate, consider a case of
self-defense that is the same as the first except, unknown to me, I could
have prevented the two from shooting me by merely uttering to them a re-
ligious slogan that would have identified me as a member of their religious
group. It is not that I had the false belief that uttering the slogan would
not have prevented them from shooting me. It is that I had no beliefs
about this at all. Here I do have a type i defense of self-defense for in-
tending to kill them, and I had no false beliefs. So I have a subjective jus-
tification for the intention. But I do not have an objective justification for
the intention because my type i defense of self-defense for it is not inde-
feasible. If I had known all the facts, and other things were equal, then I
would have known that I could have prevented their killing me merely by
uttering the slogan. So I would have known that killing them was not the
least harmful means to preventing them from killing me. Hence, I would
not have had a type i defense of self-defense for intending to kill them.
Second, the mere fact that a criminal actor intends to perform her act
on the basis of some false beliefs does not entail that she lacks an objective
justification for her intention. To illustrate, consider a case of self-defense
that is the same as the first except, unknown to me, if the two had shot, a
gust of wind would have blown their bullets into a tree off of which the
bullets would have ricocheted back into me, thereby killing me. In this
case, I intend to kill the two on the basis of my false belief that if they had
shot, their bullets would have flown directly into me. Other things being
equal, if I had believed that a gust of wind would have blown their bullets
into a tree, I would not have believed they were a threat to me and so
would not have intended to kill them. Nevertheless, I still have an objec-
tive justification for intending to kill them. For given my actual beliefs and
motive, I have a type i defense of self-defense for the intention. And this
defense is indefeasible. If I had known all the facts, and other things were
equal, then I would have known that my killing them was necessary to
prevent their killing me. So I still would have had the type i defense of
self-defense for intending to kill them.
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Third, the mere fact that a criminal actor has an objective justifica-
tion for intending to perform her act does not entail that (a) no one has
an objective justification for intending to resist her act or (b) third par-
ties could have an objective justification for intending to perform the act
on her behalf"' To illustrate, suppose I and another person consent to
box each other but only each other on the condition that each of us
boxes without the assistance of third parties. As a consequence, I have
an objective justification for intending to strike him because I have an
indefeasible type i defense of consent for this intention. But he also has
an objective justification for intending to resist my striking him because
he also has an indefeasible type i defense of consent for this intention.
Furthermore, no third parties could have an objective justification for
intending to strike my opponent on my behalf because no third parties
could have an indefeasible type i defense for this intention. In particu-
lar, no third parties could have an indefeasible type i defense of consent
for intending to strike him on my behalf given the restricted scope of his
consent.
Fourth, the mere fact that a criminal actor has a full subjective justifi-
cation for intending to perform her act does entail that her intention is
subjectively right in a weak sense. Someone's intention is subjectively right
in a weak sense if and only if she does not disrespect the rights of others
by having the intention given her actual beliefs and motives. Similarly, the
mere fact that a criminal actor has a full objective justification for intend-
ing to perform her act does entail that her intention is objectively right in
a weak sense. Someone's intention is objectively right in a weak sense if
and only if she would not disrespect the rights of others by having the in-
tention and some motive for it under conditions in which (a) she knew all
the facts and (b) other things were equal.
31. Compare George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 759-62 (978) (endorsing
such an entailment), with Mitchell N. Berman, Justifications and Excuses, Law and
Morality, 53 Duke L.J. i, 62-64 (2003) (rejecting such an entailment), Michael Corrado,
Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 465, 466-67,
491-93 (I992) (same), Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justifications
in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. Rev.
61, 87-98 (I984) (same), R.A. Duff, Rethinking Justifications, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 829, 830
(2004) (same), Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84
Colum. L. Rev. I897, I918-27 (1984) (same), and Douglas N. Husak, Conflicts of
Justifications, 18 Law & Phil. t8 (i999) (same).
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However, the mere fact that a criminal actor has a full subjective justi-
fication for intending to perform her act does not entail that her intention
is subjectively right in a strong sense. Someone's intention is subjectively
right in a strong sense if and only if she has most reason to have the in-
tention given her actual beliefs.32 Similarly, the mere fact that a criminal
actor has a full objective justification for intending to perform her act does
not entail that the intention is objectively right in a strong sense.
Someone's intention is objectively right in a strong sense if and only if she
would have most reason to have the intention under conditions in which
(a) she knew all the facts and (b) other things were equal. 3
To illustrate, consider the previous boxing case. In it, I have a full sub-
jective and objective justification for intending to strike my opponent.
Because I know he consented to box me, I do not disrespect his rights by
intending to strike him, and I would not do so even if I knew all the facts,
and other things were equal. So my intention is both subjectively and ob-
jectively right in a weak sense. But the intention might be neither subjec-
tively nor objectively right in a strong sense. For by striking him, I know
I would cause him severe pain, and such pain might provide me with most
reason not to intend to strike him even though I know striking him would
not violate his rights.
Fifth, the mere fact that a criminal actor's intention is objectively right
in a weak or strong sense does not entail that she has a subjective or objective
justification for the intention? To illustrate, suppose I killed someone. In do-
ing so, I intended to kill him merely because I did not like him. However,
unknown to me, if I had not killed him, he would have wrongfully killed
32. There is a stronger sense of a subjective justification under which a justified inten-
tion is necessarily subjectively right in the strong sense. However, I am concerned here only
with the sense of a justification that mitigates the degree to which a criminal actor disre-
spects the rights of others in intending to perform her act. For I assume that a criminal ac-
tor is not blameworthy or liable to any punishment for her act if she did not disrespect the
rights of others in intending to perform the act. A criminal actor's intention need not be
subjectively right in the strong sense for her to avoid disrespecting the rights of others in
having the intention.
33. There is a stronger sense of an objective justification under which a justified intention
is necessarily objectively right in the strong sense. It is not my concern here. See supra note 32.
34. See George . Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr.
Robinson, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 293 (975) (rejecting such an entailment); Corrado, supra note
31, at 489 (same).
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several others. Other things being equal, this makes my intending to kill
him objectively right in both a weak and strong sense. But I do not have
a subjective or objective justification for the intention because I do not ac-
tually have a type i defense for it. By intending to kill him under the con-
ditions of my ignorance, I disrespected his right not to be killed merely
because he was unliked, and I disrespected it just as badly as I would have
if my killing him were not in fact necessary to prevent him from wrong-
fully killing the others.
Sixth, the fact that a criminal act is necessary to obtain some informa-
tion could standardly provide someone with only a subjective but not an
objective justification for intending to perform it. Although she could
have a type i defense for intending to perform the act as a means to ob-
taining the information, the type i defense would standardly not be inde-
feasible. For if she knew all the facts, and other things were equal, she
would know the information sought independently of her performing the
act. To illustrate, suppose I intend to torture someone as a necessary means
to extracting information from him that I need to prevent a disaster he
would otherwise cause. But if I knew the information sought independ-
ently of torturing him, I would know how to prevent the disaster without
torturing him. Given my actual beliefs and motive, I have a subjective jus-
tification for the intention because I have a type i defense of defense of
others for it. But I do not have an objective justification for the intention
because my type i defense for it is not indefeasible. If I knew all the facts,
and other things were equal, then I would know the information sought
independently of torturing him, and so I would know how to prevent the
disaster without torturing him. So by intending to torture him, I would
disrespect his right not to be tortured.
Seventh, the concept of a type i defense is conceptually prior to the
concepts of both a subjective and an objective justification. Both concepts
of a justification are defined in terms of a type i defense, whereas the lat-
ter cannot be defined in terms of the former. So the fact that a criminal
actor has a subjective or objective justification entails that she has a type i
defense, but the fact that she has a type i defense does not entail that she
has a subjective or objective justification." Similarly, the concept of a sub-
jective justification is conceptually prior to the concept of an objective
35. To illustrate, consider again cases of compulsion.
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justification. Subjective justifications cannot be defined in terms of objec-
tive justifications, whereas the latter can be defined in terms of the former.
On such a definition, a criminal actor has an objective justification for in-
tending to perform her act if and only if (a) she has a subjective justifica-
tion for the intention and (b) the type i defense that constitutes her
subjective justification for it is indefeasible. Thus, the fact that a criminal
actor has an objective justification entails that she has a subjective one, but
the fact that she has a subjective justification does not entail that she has
an objective one.31
C. Type 2 Defenses
When someone performs a criminal act, there is not only a presumption
that in performing it, she disrespected the rights of others to a particularly
bad degree. Given this presumption, there is also a presumption that she
has a particularly bad disposition to commit crimes at the time of assess-
ment. More precisely, there is a presumption that her act is particularly
strong evidence that she has the presumed disposition to commit crimes
at the time of assessment. In other words, there is a presumption that her
act justifies others in believing with a particularly high credence that she
has the presumed disposition to commit crimes at the time of assessment.
The badness of someone's disposition to commit crimes is a function of
at least four factors. First, it is primarily a function of the seriousness of
the crimes she is willing to commit, where the seriousness of a crime cor-
responds to how badly someone disrespects the rights of others in com-
mitting the crime. Second, it is a function of the range of people against
whom she is willing to commit crimes. Third, it is a function of the range
of situations in which she is willing to commit crimes. Fourth, it is a func-
tion of the frequency with which she is willing to commit crimes.
A type 2 defense is a consideration that blocks the otherwise justified
inference from the fact that someone performed a criminal act to her hav-
ing the presumed disposition to commit crimes at the time of assess-
ment. 7 A type 2 defense blocks this inference primarily by blocking the
36. To illustrate, consider again cases involving ignorance or mistake of fact.
37. Proponents of type 2 defenses generally endorse a "character theory of excuses."
According to a character theory, a consideration constitutes an excuse if it blocks the other-
wise justified inference from the fact that someone performed a criminal act to her having
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otherwise justified inference from the fact that someone performed a
criminal act to her being willing to commit crimes of the presumed degree
of seriousness. If a criminal actor has a full type 2 defense, her act is not
strong evidence that she has any disposition to commit crimes. In other
words, her act does not justify others in believing with any credence that
she has any disposition to commit crimes.3 8 So it does not justify others in
believing with any credence that she is willing to commit any crimes. If a
criminal actor has a partial type 2 defense, her act might be strong evi-
dence that she has some disposition to commit crimes. But her act is not
as strong of evidence that she has as bad a disposition to commit crimes
as was presumed. In other words, her act might justify others in believing
with some credence that she has some disposition to commit crimes. But
it does not justify them in believing with a credence as high as the pre-
sumed one that she has a disposition to commit crimes as bad as the pre-
sumed one. So her act might justify others in believing with some
credence that she is willing to commit some crimes. But it does not justify
them in believing with a credence as high as the presumed one that she is
willing to commit crimes as serious as the presumed ones.
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38. More precisely, if a criminal actor has a full type 2 defense for her act, the act does
not justify others in believing with any significant additional credence that she has any dis-
position to commit crimes. Even if a person has not committed any crimes, others are still
justified in believing with some positive baseline credence that she is disposed to commit
some crimes. No one is justified in being certain that anyone is not so disposed.
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Many different considerations can provide a criminal actor with a type
2 defense. For example, all type i defenses are a subset of type 2 defenses
because if a criminal actor did not disrespect the rights of others in per-
forming her act, the act is not strong evidence that she is disposed to com-
mit crimes.3 9 In addition, though, several considerations are type 2
defenses that are not type i defenses. So a criminal actor can have a type 2
defense even though in performing her act, she manifested the presumed
degree of disrespect toward the rights of others. For example, a criminal
actor can have a type 2 defense because she performed her act as a result
of an enduring mental illness that undermined her capacity to respond ap-
propriately to the moral reasons against violating the rights of others, 0 and
by the time of assessment, her illness or its symptoms have been elimi-
nated by therapy or medication.
For another example, a criminal actor can have a type 2 defense be-
cause she performed her act under conditions that would standardly
cause a temporary radical distortion in an agent's system of normative
self-governance,4' which consists in all the norms she accepts regarding
what to intend in particular situations. 42 Such a distortion is radical if the
norms the agent accepted before the distortion are radically different from
and inconsistent with the ones she accepted under the distortion. Such a
distortion is temporary if its cause is temporary, and after its cause subsides,
she returns to accepting her ex ante system of normative self-governance.
If someone committed a crime under such distorting conditions, her
crime does justify others in believing that under such conditions, she was
disposed to commit crimes. However, she has a type 2 defense for her crime
39. Although type i defenses are a subset of type 2 ones, their salience warrants a sepa-
rate exposition.
40. For the epistemic or volitional nature of such an incapacity, see infra text accom-
panying notes 49, 50.
41. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 802 (stating that an "excuse represent[s] a limited,
temporal distortion of the actor's character").
42. I assume that if a person accepts a norm regarding what to intend, the norm plays
a distinctive role in her practical reasoning. Most generally, I assume that if she accepts a
norm regarding what to intend in particular situations, then she adopts the norm as her
policy for determining what to intend in those situations. More specifically, I assume that
if she accepts a norm against intending to do something in particular situations, and she
believes those situations obtain, then she will not intend to do it in those situations. In this
sense, the acceptance of such a norm is an intention controlling attitude.
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because her committing it does not justify others in believing that after
those conditions subside, she is still disposed to commit crimes. For the fact
that under distorting conditions she was disposed to commit crimes is not
strong evidence that she is so disposed ex post. In general, what she was dis-
posed to do under the distorting conditions is not strong evidence that she
is similarly disposed ex post. Although under the distorting conditions she
accepted a norm permitting her committing crimes, ex ante she might very
well have accepted norms forbidding her committing crimes, and ex post
she might very well return to accepting such norms again.
Examples of distorting conditions include intoxication, hypnosis, som-
nambulism, provocation, and other conditions that would temporarily
impair someone's capacity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons
against violating the rights of others.43 To illustrate, consider a case of
provocation. Suppose someone returns home and without any warning of
an affair finds her husband intimately involved with his paramour. Given
the extreme emotional disturbance she immediately experiences, she de-
velops a strong motivational tendency to assault both and loses her capac-
ity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons against violating their
right not to be assaulted. As a consequence, she immediately strikes both
without the benefit of a cooling down period. In this case, the woman
does not have a type i defense for striking her husband and his paramour.
She manifested the presumed degree of disrespect toward their right not
to be assaulted. However, she does have a type 2 defense of provocation for
striking them. The extreme emotional disturbance she naturally experi-
enced in this situation would standardly cause a temporary radical change
in an agent's system of normative self-governance. So her striking the vic-
tims does justify others in believing that in her emotionally disturbed
state, she was disposed to commit crimes. But it does not justify others in
believing that she is still disposed to commit crimes after cooling off
Although while in her emotional state, she accepted a norm permitting
her committing crimes of assault, ex ante she might very well have ac-
cepted norms forbidding her committing any crimes, and ex post she
might very well accept such norms again.
To illustrate another distorting condition, suppose unknown to me, my
doctor injects into me a drug that makes me intoxicated. While intoxicated,
43. Cf. Horder, supra note i, at 139-90 (endorsing an excuse of diminished capacity).
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she then hypnotizes me, specifically implanting in me a hypnotic sugges-
tion to kill someone wrongfully. In my intoxicated hypnotic state, I in-
tentionally kill him. In this case, I do not have a type i defense for killing
the victim. In killing him, I manifested the presumed degree of disrespect
toward his right not to be killed. However, I do have a type 2 defense of
intoxication and hypnosis for killing him. Being intoxicated and hypno-
tized are distorting conditions that would standardly cause a temporary
radical change in an agent's system of normative self-governance. So my
killing the victim does justify others in believing that in my intoxicated
hypnotic state, I was disposed to commit crimes. But it does not justify
others in believing that I am still disposed to commit crimes when I am
no longer intoxicated or hypnotized. Although while intoxicated and hyp-
notized, I accepted a norm permitting my committing crimes of murder,
ex ante I might very well have accepted norms forbidding my committing
any crimes, and ex post I might very well accept such norms again.
Given my description of type 2 defenses, critics might argue that some-
one's having a full type 2 defense for a crime is generally inconsistent with
her having no type i defense for it. In a standard case of blameworthiness
and liability to punishment, a person's present self is blameworthy and li-
able to be punished for the crime of a person's past self Similarly, in a
standard case of a defense, a person's present self has a defense for the
crime of a person's past self. In the cases at issue, the present self appar-
ently has a full type 2 defense but no type i defense for the past self's
crime. And in the cases at issue, the present self's system of normative self-
governance is radically different from the system of the past self.
According to the critics, their accepting radically different systems of nor-
mative self-governance generates the following dilemma for my claim that
the present self has a full type 2 defense but no type i defense for the past
self's crime.
On the first horn of the dilemma, suppose the present self and the past
self are not the same person in the sense that they are not parts of the same
person's life. Although they have the same body, they are not the same
person because they have radically different psychological traits in virtue
of their accepting radically different systems of normative self-governance.
In this case, the present self does have a full type 2 defense for the past
self's crime. Although the past self's crime does justify others in believing
that she was disposed to commit crimes, it does not justify others in be-
lieving that the present self is similarly disposed. For the present self would
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not persist as the same person under the conditions in which the past self
would have committed crimes. In addition, though, to the full type 2 de-
fense, the present self also has a type i defense for the past self's crime.
Because they are different persons, neither the present self nor any of her
own past selves actually disrespected the rights of others in virtue of the
past self's doing so in committing the crime. So if they are different per-
sons, the present self has not only a full type 2 defense but also a type i de-
fense for the past self's crime.
On the second horn of the dilemma, suppose the present self and the
past self are the same person in the sense that they are parts of the same per-
son's life. Although they have radically different psychological traits, they
are the same person because they have the same body and are psychologi-
cally connected or continuous in other relevant ways. In this case, the pres-
ent self does lack a type i defense for the past self's crime. For the past self
did disrespect the rights of others in committing the crime, and the past
self is a past self of the present self. In addition, though, to lacking a type i
defense, the present self also lacks a full type 2 defense for the past self's
crime. For the past self's crime justifies others in believing that she was dis-
posed to commit crimes under certain conditions. And because the present
self and the past self are the same person, her crime also justifies others in
believing that the present self is disposed to commit crimes under those
same conditions. So if they are the same person, the present self has neither
a full type 2 defense nor a type i defense for the past self's crime. As a con-
sequence, whether or not the present self and the past self are the same per-
son, the former could not have a full type 2 defense but no type i defense
for the latter's crime. So in the cases at issue, someone could not have a full
type 2 defense but no type i defense for committing a crime.
To illustrate the first horn of the dilemma, reconsider the case in which
I, my present self, apparently have a full type 2 defense but no type i de-
fense for my apparent past self's killing someone while intoxicated and
hypnotized. Suppose, though, that my apparent past self is not in fact my
past self: we are not the same person in the sense that we are not both parts
of the same person's life. Although we have the same body, we are not the
same person because we have radically different psychological traits. In
particular, I accept norms forbidding my committing any crimes, whereas
he accepted norms permitting his committing crimes of murder. In this
case, I have a full type 2 defense for his killing. Although his killing justi-
fies others in believing that he was disposed to commit crimes, it does not
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justify others in believing that I am similarly disposed. For I would not
persist as the same person under the conditions of intoxication and hyp-
notism in which he would have committed crimes. In addition, though,
to having a full type 2 defense, I also have a type i defense for his killing.
Because we are different persons, neither I nor any of my past selves dis-
respected the rights of others in virtue of his doing so in killing the vic-
tim. So if we are different persons, I have not only a full type 2 defense,
but also a type i defense for his killing.
To illustrate the second horn, reconsider the same case. Suppose,
though, that my apparent past self is in fact my past self: we are the same
person in the sense that we are both parts of the same person's life.
Although we have radically different psychological traits, we are the same
person because we have the same body and are psychologically connected
or continuous in other relevant ways. In this case, I do lack a type i defense
for my past self's killing because he is my past self, and he did disrespect
the rights of others in killing the victim. In addition, though, to lacking a
type i defense, I also lack a type 2 defense for his killing. For his killing jus-
tifies others in believing that I am now disposed to commit crimes when in
a similarly intoxicated hypnotic state. So if I and my apparent past self are
the same person, I have neither a full type 2 defense nor a type i defense for
his killing. As a consequence, whether or not we are the same person, I
could not have a full type 2 defense but no type i defense for his killing.
In response, there is no dilemma for the cases at issue. Someone's having
a full type 2 defense for a crime is not generally inconsistent with her hav-
ing no type i defense for it. The first horn of the purported dilemma is im-
plausible because it rests on an implausible theory of personal identity. In
the cases at issue, the present self and the past self do have radically differ-
ent psychological traits in virtue of their accepting radically different systems
of normative self-governance. So they do have radically different personali-
ties or characters. But this fact by itself does not entail that they are differ-
ent persons in the sense that they are not parts of the same person's life. For
example, almost every old adult has many past selves who were very young
children with radically different psychological traits from her present self. In
spite of their radical psychological differences, they are the same person."
44. See Thomas Reid, Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identity, in Personal
Identity i3 (John Perry ed., I975).
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In the cases at issue, the selves might also be the same person even
though they have radically different psychological traits. Three facts could
support such a possibility. First, the selves have not only the same brain, but
also the same body.5 Second, they might be psychologically connected to
each other in the sense that they might have some significant psychological
traits in common, and the traits of the past self might have caused the traits
of the present self in the normal way that preserves the relation of personal
identity between selves. For example, the present self might remember
some experiences of the past self. Third, even if they are not psychologically
connected to each other, they might be psychologically continuous with
each other in the sense that the present self might be connected to the past
self by a chain of selves such that each self in the chain is psychologically
connected to its immediately preceding self in the chain." Assuming they
have the same brain and body, and are psychologically connected to or con-
tinuous with each other, and there is no branching between them, then
they are the same person on any plausible theory of personal identity even
though they have radically different psychological traits.
The second horn of the purported dilemma is implausible because its
sense of a disposition is too broad. According to the broad sense, someone
is presently disposed to do something if she would do it under any possi-
ble conditions. But the sense of a disposition at issue in type 2 defenses is
much narrower. It is the sense of a disposition that is constitutive of a char-
acter trait.4 7 According to the character sense, someone is presently disposed
to do something only if she would do it under a relevant range of condi-
tions. And the relevant range consists only in those conditions in which her
present system of normative self-governance is held fixed. In other words,
the relevant range consists only in those conditions in which she would ac-
cept the same system of normative self-governance that she actually accepts
at present. So the relevant range does not include conditions in which she
45. See Bernard Williams, The Self and the Future, in Problems of the Self 46 (1973)
(defending the possibility that the relation of personal identity consists in a relation of bod-
ily continuity).
46. See Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 8o Phil. Rev. 3 (1971) (defending a psychological
continuity theory of personal identity); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 204-o9 (1984)
(same); Sydney Shoemaker, Persons and Their Pasts, 7 Am. Phil. Q. 269 (970) (same).
47. Cf. Richard B. Brandt, Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis, 7 Am. Phil. Q.
23 (1970) (describing character traits in terms of dispositions).
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would accept a system of normative self-governance that is radically differ-
ent from the one she actually accepts at present. What she would do under
such conditions is not relevant to what she is presently disposed to do in
the character sense of a disposition at issue in type 2 defenses.
To illustrate the distinction between these senses of a disposition, con-
sider someone who accepts a norm of extreme honesty that forbids her
from lying under any conditions. In the character sense of a disposition,
she is disposed to be honest and not disposed to be dishonest. In the rel-
evant range of conditions, she would never lie because she would accept a
norm of extreme honesty in those conditions. Nevertheless, she might still
have a broad disposition to be dishonest. For example, it might be the case
that if she were to suffer certain types of brain damage, she would lie be-
cause, under those conditions, she would accept a norm permitting her
to lie. Such a broad disposition, though, does not bear on what she is
presently disposed to do in the character sense of a disposition.
Now in the cases at issue, a person has a full type 2 defense but no type
i defense for committing a crime. Given that she has no type i defense for
the crime, it justifies others in believing that she has a broad disposition to
commit crimes because it justifies others in believing that she would com-
mit crimes under the type of conditions that actually elicited her crime. So
the crime justifies others in believing that under the eliciting conditions,
she would accept norms permitting her to commit crimes. But given that
she has a full type 2 defense for the crime, it does not justify others in be-
lieving that she is presently disposed to commit crimes in the character
sense of a disposition. Her crime does not justify others in believing that at
present, she actually accepts norms permitting her to commit crimes. For
given that she has a full type 2 defense for the crime, the fact that she ac-
cepted such norms under the eliciting conditions is not strong evidence
that she accepts such norms at present after those conditions have subsided.
To illustrate, reconsider the case in which I have a full type 2 defense
but no type i defense for killing someone while I am intoxicated and hyp-
notized. Given that I have no type i defense for the crime, it justifies oth-
ers in believing that I have a broad disposition to commit crimes because
it justifies others in believing that I would commit crimes under condi-
tions in which I were similarly intoxicated and hypnotized. So my crime
justifies others in believing that under such distorting conditions, I would
accept norms permitting my committing crimes. But given that I have a
full type 2 defense for the crime, it does not justify others in believing that
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I am presently disposed to commit crimes in the character sense of a dis-
position. The crime does not justify others in believing that at present, I
actually accept norms permitting my committing crimes. For given that I
have a full type 2 defense for the crime, the fact that I accepted such norms
while intoxicated and hypnotized is not strong evidence that I accept such
norms at present after those distorting conditions have subsided.
D. Type 3 Defenses
When someone performs a criminal act, there is a presumption that in
performing it, she flouted certain moral reasons against violating the rights
of others. As a consequence, there is a presumption that at the time of as-
sessment, she is disposed to flout a relevant class of moral reasons against
violating the rights of others, where the relevant class is a function of the
moral reasons she is presumed to have flouted in performing the act. Type
3 defenses are considerations that undermine a criminal actor's capacity to
respond appropriately to the relevant class of moral reasons at the time of
assessment.18 If a criminal actor has a full type 3 defense, she lacks the ca-
pacity to respond appropriately to any of the relevant moral reasons. If she
has a partial type 3 defense, she might have the capacity to respond ap-
propriately to some of the relevant moral reasons, but not to all of them
and particularly not to the strongest of them.
A criminal actor might lack the capacity in two respects. First, she
might lack the epistemic capacity to recognize the relevant reasons or to
appreciate them in the sense of recognizing them as reasons. The scope of
her epistemic incapacity might vary. At one extreme, she might have a
broad incapacity to recognize or appreciate any reasons whether moral or
nonmoral. At another extreme, she might have only a narrow incapacity
to recognize or appreciate the relevant moral reasons. Second, even if she
has the epistemic capacity, she might lack the volitional capacity to con-
trol what she intends to do in response to her judgments about what the
relevant moral reasons count for or against her intending. 9 So she might
48. Cf. Scanlon, supra note ii, at 28o (describing defenses that consist in an incapacity
to respond appropriately to reasons); Strawson, supra note ii, at 8-io (same); Watson,
supra note ii, at 123 (same); Model Penal Code art. 4 (1985) (same).
49. Assuming she suffers from such an incapacity, she might judge that she has most
reason not to intend to do something but intend to do it anyway, and vice versa.
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lack the capacity to control what norms she accepts governing intentions
in response to her judgments about what norms the relevant moral reasons
count for or against her accepting. 0 The scope of her volitional capacity
might also vary. At one extreme, she might have a broad incapacity to con-
trol what she intends to do in response to her judgments about what any
reasons count for or against her intending. At another extreme, she might
have only a narrow incapacity to control what she intends to do in re-
sponse to her judgments about what the relevant moral reasons count for
or against her intending. Examples of such epistemic or volitional incapac-
ities include insanity, more specific forms of mental illness such as klepto-
mania, and possibly other limiting conditions more prevalent among the
normal population.
Some considerations that provide type 3 defenses also provide type i
and type 2 ones. To illustrate, suppose I suffer from an incurable mental
illness that makes me permanently incapable of understanding the con-
cept of a person. So I am permanently incapable of recognizing others as
thinking, feeling, and demanding subjects. Now suppose I kill someone to
acquire a resource, such as food, that he would otherwise consume or take
away. In this case, my mental illness provides me with a type i, type 2, and
type 3 defense for killing him. It provides me with a type i defense because
I could not have disrespected the victim's rights without recognizing him
as a person. It provides me with a type 2 defense because it blocks the oth-
erwise justified inference from the fact that I killed him to my being dis-
posed to commit crimes. For it blocks the otherwise justified inference
from the fact that I killed him to my being disposed to disrespect the
rights of others.' And in virtue of being permanent, my mental illness
provides me with a type 3 defense because my incapacity to understand the
concept of a person makes me incapable, at the time of assessment, of re-
sponding appropriately to any of the moral reasons against violating the
5o. Assuming she suffers from such an incapacity, she might judge that she has most
reason to accept a particular norm governing intentions but reject it anyway, and vice versa.
51. In this case, I am disposed to perform criminal acts. That is, I am disposed to per-
form acts that satisfy the actus reus requirements of a crime. However, I am not disposed
to commit crimes because I am incapable of satisfying their mens rea requirements. For I
am incapable of disrespecting the rights of others in performing criminal acts in virtue of
the fact that I am incapable of recognizing others as persons. For example, we might sup-
pose that if I were ever to strangle someone to death, I would believe I were merely squeez-
ing a lemon.
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rights of others. The illness makes me incapable of recognizing or appre-
ciating such reasons.
Although there is some overlap, not all considerations that provide type
3 defenses also provide type i or type 2 ones. Unlike type i defenses, type
3 ones are consistent with a criminal actor's disrespecting the rights of oth-
ers to the presumed degree in performing her act. Type 3 defenses focus
only on considerations that obtain at the time of assessing the criminal ac-
tor for blameworthiness and liability to punishment. Specifically, type 3
defenses focus only on her capacities at the time of assessment rather than
at the time she performed her act.52 So if the criminal actor lacks the rele-
vant capacity at the time of assessment, she has a type 3 defense for her act
even if she had the capacity when she performed it.13 Type i defenses,
though, focus only on considerations that obtained at the time the crimi-
nal actor performed her act. Specifically, type i defenses focus only on how
badly she disrespected the rights of others in performing the act. So if she
did so to the presumed degree, she lacks a type i defense for the act even
if she has a type 3 defense for it because she lacks the relevant capacity at
the time of assessment.
To illustrate, suppose I intentionally kill someone for no sound reason
under conditions in which I have the capacity to respond appropriately to
the moral reasons against doing so. After killing him, though, I develop
the mental illness that makes me incapable of understanding the concept
of a person. In this case, I lack a type i defense for killing the victim be-
cause in doing so, I disrespected his rights to the presumed degree. But I
have a type 3 defense for killing him because at the time of assessment, I
lack the capacity to respond appropriately to any of the moral reasons
against violating the rights of others.
Unlike type 2 defenses, type 3 ones are consistent with a criminal act's
providing others with knowledge that the actor has the presumed disposi-
tion to commit crimes. Type 3 defenses are concerned with whether the
criminal actor has the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant
moral reasons. But they are not concerned with whether she actually re-
sponds appropriately to such reasons. She might not actually respond
52. If a criminal actor performed her act due to a mere temporary incapacity at the
time of the act, the temporary incapacity would constitute a type 2 but not a type 3
defense.
53. See R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 14-38 (1986) (emphasizing this possibility).
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appropriately to them even if she has the capacity to." Similarly, type 3 de-
fenses are concerned with whether the criminal actor has the capacity to
be disposed to respond appropriately to such reasons. But they are not
concerned with whether she is actually so disposed. She might not be so
disposed even if she has the capacity to be." Thus, type 3 defenses are con-
cerned with whether the criminal actor has the capacity to be disposed to
choose not to commit crimes on the basis of the moral reasons against
committing them. But type 3 defenses are not concerned with whether she
is actually so disposed. Again, she might not be so disposed even if she has
the capacity to be. Type 2 defenses, though, are concerned with whether
the criminal actor is actually disposed to commit crimes insofar as they are
concerned with whether her act justifies others in believing that she is ac-
tually so disposed. Thus, if her act provides others with knowledge that
she has the presumed disposition to commit crimes, then she lacks a type
2 defense for the act even if she has a type 3 defense for it because she lacks
the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant moral reasons at the
time of assessment.
To illustrate, suppose again that I intentionally kill someone for no
sound reason. Given that I disrespected his rights in killing him, I lack a
type i defense for the act. Suppose also that I lack a type 2 defense for the
act because it provides others with knowledge that I am disposed to com-
mit crimes at the time of assessment. Nevertheless, I might still have a type
3 defense for the act because at the time of assessment, I might lack the ca-
pacity to respond appropriately to the relevant moral reasons against vio-
lating the rights of others. In this case, I do have the epistemic capacity to
54. I assume someone might not do something that she has the capacity to do. And I
assume someone might do something that she has the capacity not to do. I set aside for
further analysis the potential problems that the truth of determinism might raise for these
assumptions. I leave it an open question whether determinism is true. And I leave it an
open question whether these assumptions are consistent with the truth of determinism. Cf.
David Copp, "Ought" Implies "Can," Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities, in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities 265, 291-95 (David
Widerker & Michael McKenna eds., 2003) (arguing that determinism is consistent with
an actor's ability to do otherwise).
55. Type 3 defenses are concerned with whether a criminal actor has the capacity to ac-
cept certain norms against violating the rights of others. But they are not concerned with
whether she actually accepts such norms. She might not accept them even if she has the
capacity to.
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recognize the relevant moral reasons, but I might suffer from an extreme
form of psychopathy that makes me incapable of recognizing them as rea-
sons. For example, in killing the victim, I did recognize that I was killing
a person, but as a result of the psychopathy, I might have lacked then and
now the capacity to recognize this fact as a moral reason against killing
him. 6 Alternatively, even if I have all the epistemic capacities, I might suf-
fer from a mental illness that makes me incapable of controlling what I in-
tend to do in response to my judgments about what the relevant moral
reasons count for or against intending. For example, I might have judged
that I had most reason not to intend to kill the victim, but as a result of the
mental illness, I might have intended to do so anyway. Assuming I con-
tinue to suffer from such capacities at the time of assessment, they provide
me with a type 3 defense but not a type 2 defense for killing the victim.
E. Additional Types of Defenses
At this point, I have spelled out three general types of defenses that account
for a very wide range of more particular defenses. In two ways, though, these
three types do not exhaust every type of defense. First, there might be other
general types that pick out particular defenses left out from the three cov-
ered so far. Later in the paper, I will argue that the theory of punitive desert
that best explains the mitigating effects of these three types does entail a
more general fourth type of defense. Expounding the fourth type must await
our exposition of my restorative signaling theory of punitive desert. Second,
there are many finer-grained distinctions to be drawn among the more par-
ticular defenses picked out by the more general types. In other words, within
the general types of defenses, we could demarcate many subtypes.
We have already seen that justifications are a subset of type i defenses
whose salience warrants a separate exposition. Other salient subtypes in-
clude exemptions, failure of proof defenses, and excuses. An exemption is
an enduring incapacity to respond appropriately to any moral reasons.57
Under an exemption, a person would not be blameworthy or liable to
punishment for any acts she might perform, including criminal acts.
Exemptions are a subset of type 3 defenses.
56. For an actual case of a criminal who might have suffered from such an incapacity,
see the story of Robert Harris discussed in Watson, supra note 1s, at 131-37.
57. See Tadros, supra note 14, at 124-29.
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Consider now failure of proof defenses. 8 In general, the state is justi-
fied in punishing someone for committing a crime only if a statute ex-
plicitly prohibits the crime." The statute spells out the crime's essential
elements. Some of the elements consist in actus reus requirements. They
describe the type of act that someone must perform to commit the crime.
Other elements consist in mens rea requirements. They describe the state
of mind with which someone must perform the act to commit the crime.
If someone does not satisfy all the elements of the crime, then she has a
failure of proof defense to the charge that she committed it. This defense
consists in her not satisfying one of the crime's elements. Failure of proof
defenses are a subset of type i defenses.
Failure of proof defenses are especially significant because they have dis-
tinctive implications for the state's burden of proving at trial that a defen-
dant not only committed a crime, but also is liable to punishment for
committing the crime. ° At trial, the state has the initial burden of prov-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant satisfied all the elements
of the crime charged.6' So the state has the initial burden of proving be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant lacks a failure of proof defense
to the charge that she committed the crime. However, the state might not
have the initial burden of proving that the defendant lacks other types of
defenses, such as type 3 ones.62 The defendant herself might have the ini-
tial burden of proving that she has these other defenses before the state in-
curs a burden of proving otherwise.
The concept of an excuse is open to broader and narrower concep-
tions.6 3 On a broader conception, the concept of an excuse picks out any
defense that a criminal actor might have for her act. On a narrower con-
ception, the concept of an excuse refers only to a class of defenses not
picked out by some range of other salient types of defenses, such as justi-
fications, exemptions, and failure of proof defenses.
58. See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 181-82 0995); Robinson, supra
note 6, at 2o4-o8.
59. See Model Penal Code § 1.05(0) (1985).
6o. See Dressier, supra note 58, at 51-61; Robinson, supra note 6, at 250-64.
6i. See Model Penal Code § 1.12(l) (1985).
62. See id. § 1.12(2)-(4).
63. See Marcia Baron, Excuses, Excuses, I Crim. L. & Phil. 21, 37 (2007) (crediting
Antony Duff with pointing out broader and narrower senses of "excuse").
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Whether a defense falls under the extension of one of these more par-
ticular subtypes might have significant implications. But for the purposes
of explaining the mitigating effects of defenses in general, we can abstract
away from these more fine-grained distinctions between defenses and fo-
cus only on the general types. For in virtue of explaining the mitigating ef-
fects of the more general types, we would thereby explain the mitigating
effects of all the more particular subtypes of defenses, such as justifica-
tions, exemptions, failure of proof defenses, and excuses.
IV. A GENERAL THEORY OF THE JUSTIFICATION
OF PUNISHMENT
My general theory specifies the general conditions under which the state
would be justified in punishing someone against her will. On the strong
sense of justification at issue here, it specifies the general conditions under
which the state would not be open to any warranted attitude of moral dis-
approval for punishing someone against her will. So the theory specifies
the general conditions under which the state has most reason to punish
someone against her will. According to the theory, the state is justified in
imposing a punishment on someone against her will if and only if five re-
quirements are satisfied. First, according to the desert requirement, the
person must deserve the punishment. The desert requirement is warranted
because if the state were to impose an undeserved punishment on some-
one against her will, it would violate her rights. The fact that the state
would violate someone's rights by doing something provides the state with
an overriding reason not to do it.' Second, according to the general rights
requirement, imposing the punishment on the person must not violate the
rights of anyone else. Third, according to the value requirement, the ex-
pected value of the consequences of imposing the punishment on the per-
son must be at least as high as the expected value of the consequences of
64. To keep matters simple, I set aside the fact that rights standardly have thresholds
such that the state might have most reason to violate someone's rights when the conse-
quences of not violating them would be sufficiently bad. So I set aside the possibility that
in some emergency situations, the state might have most reason to impose an undeserved
punishment on someone against her will because doing so would be necessary to "avoid
catastrophic moral horror." Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 30 (1974).
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any other available act that would not violate anyone's rights. The value
requirement is warranted because if the expected value of such an alterna-
tive act were higher than the expected value of imposing the punishment
on her, the state would have more reason to perform the alternative act in-
stead. Fourth, according to the epistemic requirement, the state must
know that the first three requirements are satisfied in imposing the pun-
ishment on her. Fifth, according to the motivation requirement, the state
must be appropriately motivated by its knowledge that the first three re-
quirements are satisfied in imposing the punishment on her.
Assuming the state would punish criminal actors against their will,
both the desert and the value requirements are prima facie plausible
grounds on which to explain the mitigating effects of defenses on a crim-
inal actor's liability to punishment. Regarding the desert. requirement,
criminal actors with full defenses might not deserve any punishment.
Those with partial defenses might deserve to be punished only to a miti-
gated degree. Regarding the value requirement, the expected value of pun-
ishing criminal actors with full defenses might be lower than the expected
value of not punishing them at all. The expected value of punishing those
with partial defenses to an unmitigated degree might be lower than the ex-
pected value of punishing them to a mitigated degree. We will consider
each requirement in turn.
V. THE VALUE REQUIREMENT
Suppose the benefits of a punishment consist in its good consequences,
and its costs consist in its bad consequences. Suppose the net benefit of a
punishment consists in the difference between its benefits and costs. To
explain on the basis of the value requirement the mitigating effects of de-
fenses on a criminal actor's liability to punishment, we must prove two
claims. First, we must show that the expected costs would outweigh the
expected benefits of punishing criminal actors with full defenses. Second,
we must show that the expected net benefit of punishing criminal actors
with partial defenses to an unmitigated degree would be lower than the
expected net benefit of punishing them to a mitigated degree. We will fo-
cus primarily on trying to prove the first claim regarding full defenses. If
we find such a proof, we can consider whether it generalizes to prove the
second claim regarding partial defenses. But if the first is unprovable, the
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second is too. In the following analysis, whenever I refer to a defense, I re-
fer to a full defense unless I note otherwise. To be concise, I leave the ex-
pected qualification to costs and benefits implicit.
A. First Argument
According to one argument, the consequences of a punishment include
the punishment itself, and the punishment itself is intrinsically bad.65 So a
punishment is itself a cost, which I call its "punitive cost." To satisfy the
value requirement, a punishment must have some benefit that outweighs
its punitive cost. One benefit of a punishment is its deterrence benefit.
The state deters people from performing criminal acts by following a pol-
icy of threatening to punish anyone who performs criminal acts and pun-
ishing those who it discovers have performed them. Such a policy achieves
deterrence by providing people with a strong prudential incentive not to
perform criminal acts for fear of being punished for performing them. The
deterrence benefit of a punishment is the benefit of preventing all the
criminal acts that it deters people from performing. Assuming the main
benefit of a punishment is its deterrence benefit, some might contend that
the punitive cost would outweigh the benefits of any punishment that has
no deterrence benefit. They might argue that punishing criminal actors
with defenses would have no deterrence benefit. They might contend that
criminal actors with defenses are undeterrable. In other words, when
someone performs a criminal act with a defense, she performs the act un-
der conditions in which she could not be deterred from performing it by
any threat to punish her for performing the act under its description as a
criminal act. Because criminal actors with defenses are undeterrable, pun-
ishing them would deter no one from performing any criminal acts."6 So
punishing them would have no deterrence benefit. Therefore, the punitive
costs would outweigh the benefits of punishing them.
65. To keep matters simple, I assume every punishment is intrinsically bad. I also as-
sume that the degree to which a punishment is intrinsically bad is proportional to its sever-
ity. The more severe a punishment, the worse it is.
66. Cf. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
I58-6z (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (arguing that punishing criminal actors
with some defenses would be inefficacious as it would not prevent any mischief).
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To illustrate, consider a defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. If a
criminal actor has such a defense, she did not believe her act had the prop-
erties that made it a criminal act. So she could not have been deterred
from performing her act by any threat to punish her for performing such
an act under its description as a criminal act. Because criminal actors with
a defense of ignorance or mistake of fact are undeterrable, punishing them
would deter no one from performing any criminal acts, and so punishing
them would have no deterrence benefits.
In response, the first argument is unpersuasive for two reasons among
others. According to the first objection, suppose criminal actors with some
defenses are undeterrable. So punishing them would not deter others from
performing criminal acts under those same defense eliciting conditions.
Nevertheless, punishing them might deter people from performing crimi-
nal acts under other conditions, and so punishing them might have deter-
rence benefits that would outweigh the punitive costs of punishing them.67
For punishing people for performing a particular type of criminal act un-
der a particular type of condition can generally deter others from perform-
ing different types of criminal acts under different types of conditions.
Punishing criminal actors with defenses can have such a general deter-
rence effect in two ways. First, punishing them can make others more
vividly aware of how bad it would be to suffer a punishment in general.
By seeing, hearing about, or talking to someone punished, others might
better appreciate the severity of the suffering involved in being punished.
Second, punishing them can make others discount to a lesser degree their
probability of being punished for performing criminal acts in general. For
punishing criminal actors with defenses indicates that the state is actively
trying to detect and punish criminal actors in general. And the state's pun-
ishing them reduces the range of defenses available to people charged with
committing crimes. If the state were not to punish them, some might
commit crimes without those defenses because they believe they can avoid
being punished for their crimes by deceiving the state into believing that
they performed their acts with those defenses. 68 But if the state were to
67. See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in Punishment
and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law I, i9 (8968).
68. See id. Some might worry there is tension between my presuppositions 4 and 5 and
the possibility of someone's committing a crime because she believes she will deceive the
state into believing falsely that she performed her criminal act with a defense. For to deceive
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punish criminal actors with defenses, others would not discount their
probability of punishment in response to the possibility of such deception.
According to the second objection, not all criminal actors with defenses
are undeterrable. For example, consider type 3 defenses in which a criminal
actor lacks the epistemic capacity to recognize and appreciate as such the
moral reasons against violating the rights of others. Such an actor might
still retain the capacity to recognize and appreciate merely prudential rea-
sons against performing criminal acts. Assuming she retains the capacity to
respond appropriately to prudential reasons, she might be deterrable. For
another example, consider duress. In a standard case of duress, someone
performs a criminal act in response to a threat to harm her unless she per-
forms it. Assuming the threatened harm was very severe and imminent, it
would have been very difficult for the criminal actor to resist performing
the act. So she was not easily deterrable. But she still might have been de-
terrable by the state's threat of an extraordinarily severe punishment for not
resisting under duress.69 Such a punishment would harm her much more
severely than the harm she faced for resisting under duress.
B. Second Argument
A second argument might concede that criminal actors with some de-
fenses are deterrable, and punishing criminal actors with any defense can
have some deterrence benefits. But with respect to particular defenses,
the state in this way, she must deceive the state about her capacities or the beliefs, inten-
tions, and motives with which she performed her act. In fact, though, there is no tension.
According to presuppositions 4 and 5, when a criminal actor is assessed for blameworthi-
ness and liability to punishment, everyone knows all the facts about her capacities and the
beliefs, intentions, and motives with which she performed her act. However, there is no
presupposition that everyone believes that presuppositions 4 and 5 will be satisfied at the
time of assessment. In particular, there is no presupposition that a criminal actor will be-
lieve at the time of her act that everyone will know all the relevant facts at the time she is
assessed for blameworthiness or liability to punishment. Presuppositions 4 and 5 are con-
sistent with a criminal actor's believing at the time of her act that the state will not know
all the relevant facts at the time of assessment.
69. For this reason, considerations of deterrence arguably favor punishing criminal ac-
tors with a duress defense extraordinarily severely. See Anthony Kenny, Duress Per Minas
as a Defence to Crime: II, in Law, Morality and Rights 345, 352 (M.A. Stewart ed., 1983);
J.L. Mackie, Duress and Necessity as Defences to Crime: A Postscript, in Law, Morality
and Rights 365, 367 (M.A. Stewart ed., 1983); 2 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of
the Criminal Law of England 107 (London, MacMillan 1883).
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there are other reasons to believe that the punitive costs would outweigh
the benefits of punishing criminal actors with them. Consider again
duress. Assuming it is extraordinarily difficult to deter people from com-
plying with a threat under duress, people under duress are deterrable only
by punishing them extraordinarily severely for not resisting the threat. An
extraordinarily severe punishment, though, would be very bad in itself.
Moreover, such a punishment would be worse than the harm someone
would cause by performing the criminal act demanded under duress.
Hence, the punitive cost of punishing a criminal actor with a duress de-
fense extraordinarily severely not only would be very high, but also would
outweigh its deterrence benefit.70 So the punitive costs would outweigh
the benefits of punishing criminal actors with a duress defense.
In response, we might concede that an extraordinarily severe punish-
ment would be worse than the harm someone would cause by performing
a single criminal act under duress. But the second argument is still unper-
suasive because, among other reasons, punishing a criminal actor with a
duress defense extraordinarily severely might deter multiple people from
performing multiple criminal acts under duress. The extraordinarily severe
punishment might be better than the aggregate harm that others would
cause by performing multiple criminal acts under duress. So the deter-
rence benefit of punishing a criminal actor with a duress defense extraor-
dinarily severely not only might be very high, but also might outweigh its
punitive cost.
C. Third Argument
A third argument might concede that punishing a criminal actor with a
duress defense would deter multiple people from performing multiple
criminal acts under duress. But in addition to having a deterrence benefit,
the punishment would also have a deterrence cost, which is the cost of
preventing all the acts it would deter people from performing. Some might
contend that the deterrence cost of the punishment would outweigh its de-
terrence benefit because criminal acts performed under duress are opti-
mific. They are optimific because in a case of duress, the threatened harm
70. Cf. Bentham, supra note 66, at 159, 163-64 (arguing that punishing criminal actors
with some defenses would be unprofitable or too expensive because "the mischief it would
produce would be greater than what it prevented").
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would be worse for the person under duress than the alternative harm she
would directly cause by performing the criminal act demanded. 7' Hence,
assuming that punishing criminal actors with a duress defense would de-
ter only optimific acts, the deterrence costs would outweigh the deterrence
benefits of punishing them. So the overall costs would outweigh the over-
all benefits of punishing them.
To illustrate, suppose someone threatens to assault me unless I commit
a theft. My committing the theft would be optimific because the harm of
my being assaulted would be worse than the alternative harm I would di-
rectly cause by committing the theft. Thus, assuming that punishing me
for committing the theft would deter only optimific acts, the deterrence
cost would outweigh the deterrence benefit of the punishment. So its
overall costs would outweigh its overall benefits.
In response, the third argument is unpersuasive for three reasons
among others. First, suppose for the sake. of argument that in a case of
duress, the threatened harm would be worse for the person under duress
than the alternative harm she would directly cause by performing the
criminal act demanded. Nevertheless, performing the criminal act might
not be optimific. For performing it is not to resist the threat. And not re-
sisting the threat might result in the indirect harm of increasing the inci-
dence of duress and hence the number of victims of duress. Conversely,
resisting the threat might result in the indirect benefit of decreasing the in-
cidence of duress and the number of victims of duress.
On the one hand, by resisting the threat and hence not performing the
criminal act demanded, the person under duress would signal that she is
threat resistant in the sense that she is disposed to resist unauthoritative
threats under duress. In so doing, she would also set a precedent of threat
resistance for others to follow when they are under duress. As a result, oth-
ers might also resist threats under duress, and thereby signal that they too
are threat resistant. As a consequence, potentially threatening agents
might infer that she and others too are threat resistant. Thus, they might
refrain from putting others under duress as a means of fulfilling their
criminal objectives. For if someone wants others to perform a criminal act,
and he knows they are likely to be threat resistant, then it is not rational
71. Cf. Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A
Justification, Not an Excuse-and Why It Matters, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 833 (2003).
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for him to place them under duress as a means of getting them to perform
the act. So by increasing the perceived incidence of threat resistance, re-
sisting threats under duress might reduce the incidence of duress and the
number victims of duress. 72
On the other hand, by not resisting the threat and hence performing
the criminal act demanded, the person under duress would signal that she
is not threat resistant. In so doing, she would also set a precedent of threat
non-resistance for others to follow when they are under duress. As a result,
others might also not resist threats under duress, and thereby signal that
they too are not threat resistant. As a consequence, potentially threatening
agents might infer that she and others too are not threat resistant. Thus,
they might engage in putting others under duress as a means of fulfilling
their criminal objectives. For if someone wants others to perform a crim-
inal act, and he knows they are likely to be not threat resistant, then it
might be prudentially rational for him to place them under duress as a
means of getting them to perform the act. So by decreasing the perceived
incidence of threat resistance, not resisting threats under duress might in-
crease the incidence of duress and the number of victims of duress.
Assuming the indirect benefits of resistance and the indirect harms of non-
resistance would be sufficiently large, performing the criminal act de-
manded under duress would not be optimific.
Second, suppose for the sake of argument that the criminal acts of those
with a duress defense are optimific. Nevertheless, the deterrence benefits
might still outweigh the deterrence costs of punishing criminal actors with
a duress defense. In addition to deterring optimific criminal acts per-
formed under duress, punishing them might also deter non-optimific
criminal acts performed under other conditions. In response to punishing
them, potential criminal actors in general might become more vividly
aware of how bad being punished would be for them, and they might dis-
count to a lesser degree their probability of punishment. For example,
punishing criminal actors with a full defense of duress might deter others
from performing non-optimific criminal acts under conditions in which
they would really have only a partial defense of duress but mistakenly believe
they have a full defense of duress. The deterrence benefits might outweigh
72. Cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, supra note 46, at 20-23, 457-61 (explaining why it
would probably be rational for a person to be transparently disposed to ignore threats).
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the deterrence costs of punishing even optimific criminal acts performed
under duress if the non-optimific acts deterred are sufficiently numerous
and harmful relative to the optimific ones deterred.
Third, suppose for the sake of argument that punishing criminal actors
with a duress defense would deter only optimific criminal acts. So the di-
rect deterrence costs would outweigh the direct deterrence benefits of pun-
ishing them. Nevertheless, the overall deterrence benefits might still
outweigh the overall deterrence costs of punishing them because punishing
them might have the indirect deterrence benefit of decreasing the incidence
of duress and hence the number of victims of duress. For punishing them
might increase the number of people who are threat resistant by increasing
the number of people who are deterred from performing criminal acts de-
manded under duress. Hence, the deterrence effect of punishing criminal
actors with a duress defense might increase the incidence of threat resist-
ance. Assuming potentially threatening agents would be aware of this
higher incidence, they might refrain from putting others under duress as a
means of fulfilling their criminal objectives. Thus, by increasing the per-
ceived incidence of threat resistance, the deterrence effect of punishing
criminal actors with a duress defense might decrease the incidence of duress
and the number of victims of duress." Assuming this indirect deterrence
benefit would be sufficiently large, the overall deterrence benefits might
outweigh the overall deterrence costs of punishing them. So the overall
benefits might outweigh the overall costs of punishing them.74
D. Fourth Argument
A fourth argument might concede that punishing criminal actors with a
duress defense would have indirect deterrence benefits. But according to
the argument, the overall costs would still outweigh the overall benefits of
73. By parity of reasoning, not punishing criminal actors with a duress defense might make
people less threat resistant and, consequently, might increase the incidence of duress and the
victims of duress. See Kenny, supra note 69, at 348, 352-53; Abbott v. The Queen, ['9771 A.C.
755 (Lord Salmon); cf. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, supra note 46, at 20-23, 457-61.
74. As an apparently paradoxical implication of this analysis, a punishment might be
optimific even if it deters the performance of only optimific criminal acts. The appearance
of paradox, though, dissipates in light of the fact that deterring the performance of even
optimific criminal acts can have indirect benefits that would outweigh the costs of deter-
ring such acts.
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punishing criminal actors with a duress defense or a range of other de-
fenses. The relevant range consists in those defenses that preclude a crim-
inal actor from having a fair opportunity to avoid performing her act. If
the state were to punish criminal actors with these defenses, it would deny
people a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for performing crimi-
nal acts with these defenses." Hence, by punishing them, the state would
restrict people's ability to plan on making choices that would safeguard
them from being punished.76 As a consequence of punishing them, people
would incur at least three additional costs of insecurity in response to the
possibility of being punished for performing criminal acts with these de-
fenses. First, they would invest in services to help them avoid performing
criminal acts with these defenses. Second, they would avoid engaging in
valuable activities that would place them at an unduly high risk of perform-
ing criminal acts with these defenses. Third, they would fear the possibility
of performing criminal acts with these defenses. Because punishing criminal
actors with these defenses would result in additional costs of insecurity, the
overall costs would outweigh the overall benefits of punishing them.
To illustrate, consider again duress. Criminal actors with a duress de-
fense did not have a fair opportunity to avoid performing their acts because
they knew they would have suffered serious harm if they had avoided per-
forming them. If the state were to punish them, it would deny people a fair
opportunity to avoid being punished for performing criminal acts under
duress. Hence, by punishing them, the state would restrict people's ability
to plan on making choices that would safeguard them from being pun-
ished. As a consequence of punishing them, people would incur at least
three additional costs of insecurity in response to the possibility of being
punished for performing criminal acts under duress. First, they would in-
vest more in services to reduce their risk of being put under duress. For ex-
ample, they might invest more in protective services to help them defend
against potential threats, and they might invest more in surveillance
schemes to help them avoid interacting with those who are likely to put
75. H.L.A. Hart emphasizes this point in supra note 67, at 22-24 and in Legal
Responsibility and Excuses, in Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of
Law 28 (1968). Both Hart and TM. Scanlon emphasize the importance of providing peo-
ple with a fair opportunity to avoid being punished. See Scanlon, supra note ii, at 263-67.
76. Both Hart and Scanlon emphasize the value of this ability. See their works cited in
supra note 75.
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them under duress. Second, they would avoid more valuable activities that
would leave them too vulnerable to duress. Third, they would fear more the
possibility of being put under duress. Because punishing criminal actors
with a duress defense would result in additional costs of insecurity, the
overall costs would outweigh the overall benefits of punishing them.
In response, the fourth argument is unpersuasive for at least two reasons.
First, we might concede that punishing criminal actors with the relevant
defenses would result in some additional costs of insecurity. However,
punishing them might also result in the reduction of other costs of inse-
curity. As we have noted, punishing criminal actors with defenses might
have general deterrence effects. Thus, punishing them might result in the
performance of fewer criminal acts and in fewer people being victims of
criminal acts. So if the state were to punish criminal actors with the rele-
vant defenses, it might provide more people with a fair opportunity to
avoid being victims of criminal acts. 77 Hence, by punishing them, the state
might increase the confidence with which people can plan on not being
victims of criminal acts. As a consequence of punishing them, people
might reduce the costs of insecurity they incur in response to their lower
probability of being victims of criminal acts. First, they might invest less
in services aimed at protecting them from being victims of criminal acts.
Second, they might engage in valuable activities that would otherwise
place them at an unduly high risk of being victims of criminal acts. Third,
they might fear less the possibility of being victims of criminal acts.
Assuming punishing criminal actors with the relevant defenses would re-
sult in a sufficiently large reduction in some costs of insecurity, punishing
them might have the benefit of reducing costs of insecurity overall. So the
overall benefits might outweigh the overall costs of punishing them.
To illustrate, consider again duress. As we have noted, punishing crimi-
nal actors with a duress defense might deter people from performing crim-
inal acts in general and might reduce the incidence of duress as a result of
making others more threat resistant. So punishing them might result in
fewer people performing criminal acts and fewer people being victims of
criminal acts. More specifically, punishing them might result in fewer vic-
tims of duress. Thus, if the state were to punish them, it might provide
more people with a fair opportunity to avoid being victims of criminal acts
77. See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 257, 263-64 (1987).
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in general and duress in particular. Hence, by punishing them, the state
might increase the confidence with which people can plan on not being
victims of criminal acts. As a consequence of punishing them, people might
reduce the costs of insecurity they incur in response to their lower proba-
bility of being victims of criminal acts. First, for example, they might in-
vest less in services aimed at reducing their risk of being put under duress
or being victims of criminal acts performed under duress. Second, for ex-
ample, they might engage in more valuable activities that would otherwise
leave them too vulnerable to such criminal acts. Third, for example, they
might fear less the possibility of being victims of such criminal acts.
Assuming that punishing criminal actors with a duress defense would re-
sult in a sufficiently large reduction in some costs of insecurity, punishing
them might have the benefit of reducing costs of insecurity overall. So the
overall benefits might outweigh the overall costs of punishing them.
Second, suppose for the sake of argument that punishing criminal ac-
tors with the relevant defenses would increase costs of insecurity overall.
Nevertheless, punishing them might still have significant deterrence ef-
fects and so significant deterrence benefits. Assuming the deterrence ben-
efits would be sufficiently large, they might outweigh the additional costs
of insecurity of punishing them. So the overall benefits might still out-
weigh the overall costs of punishing them.
E. Fifth Argument
A more general fifth argument might concede that punishing criminal ac-
tors with any defense could reduce costs of insecurity overall and have sig-
nificant deterrence benefits. But according to the argument, the overall
costs would still outweigh the overall benefits of punishing them because
the punitive costs of punishing them would be extremely high. They
would be extremely high because punishing them would be extremely
bad. Punishing them would be extremely bad not so much because each
would suffer extremely severely in being punished. After all, the punish-
ments need not be extremely severe. Rather punishing them would be ex-
tremely bad because they do not deserve to be punished. So punishing
them would violate their rights, and violating their rights would be ex-
tremely bad considered individually and especially in the aggregate.
In response, the fifth argument is problematic for at least four reasons.
First, it merely assumes that criminal actors with defenses deserve no
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punishment. However, this assumption stands in need of justification. Given
that criminal actors without defenses deserve some punishment, it is not clear
why those with defenses deserve no punishment. Because the argument pro-
vides no justification for its central assumption, it is unpersuasive.
Second, suppose the argument were to justify its central assumption.
Then the argument would be superfluous. If criminal actors with de-
fenses deserve no punishment, then this fact by itself explains why they
are not liable to any punishment independently of whether the costs
would outweigh the benefits of punishing them. For if they do not de-
serve any punishment, then punishing them would violate their rights.
And the state has a decisive reason not to violate someone's rights re-
gardless of whether the costs would outweigh the benefits of violating her
rights. So the state would not be justified in imposing an undeserved
punishment on someone regardless of whether the costs would outweigh
the benefits of doing so.
Third, suppose again that criminal actors with defenses deserve no
punishment. The argument is still problematic because it is not clear that
punishing a criminal actor with a defense would be extremely bad, as the
argument assumes. So it is not clear that the punitive costs of punishing
her would be extremely high, as the argument assumes. The state's pun-
ishing her would violate her rights. Hence, given the state's decisive rea-
son not to violate anyone's rights, it has a decisive reason not to punish
her. But this fact does not obviously entail that the state's punishing her
would be extremely bad.
A person's rights provide others with a decisive agent-relative reason
not to violate them. An agent-relative reason is a reason whose description
contains an essentially indexical reference to the subject of the reason,
whereas an agent-neutral reason is one whose description does not contain
such a reference.78 Specifically, people's rights provide someone with a de-
cisive agent-relative reason not to violate them herself. But people's rights
do not provide someone with a decisive agent-neutral reason to minimize
the violations of their rights in general. For example, a person does not
have most reason to violate the rights of one in order to prevent another
from violating the rights of several others.79
78. See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 152-53 (1986) (distinguishing agent-
relative from agent-neutral reasons).
79. See Nozick, supra note 64, at 30-33 (describing rights as side constraints).
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So the state's decisive reason not to punish a criminal actor with a de-
fense is an agent-relative one. As a consequence, the state is warranted for
agent-relative reasons in desiring to an extremely strong degree that it not
punish her. But again this fact does not obviously entail that the state's
punishing her would be extremely bad. For the narrow sense of value at is-
sue is an impartial one."0 On this sense, something is good only if every-
one is warranted for agent-neutral reasons in desiring that it obtain.8'
Conversely, something is bad only if everyone is warranted for agent-
neutral reasons in desiring that it not obtain. More specifically, something
is extremely bad only if everyone is warranted for agent-neutral reasons in
desiring to an extremely strong degree that it not obtain. The fact, though,
that the state is warranted for agent-relative reasons in desiring to an ex-
tremely strong degree that it not punish a criminal actor with a defense
does not obviously entail that everyone is warranted for agent-neutral rea-
sons in desiring to an extremely strong degree that the state not punish
her. Whether there is such an entailment stands in need of a justification
that the argument does not provide.
Fourth, suppose for the sake of argument that punishing a criminal ac-
tor with a defense would be extremely bad because punishing her would
violate her rights. So suppose the punitive costs of punishing criminal ac-
tors with defenses would be extremely high considered individually and
especially considered in the aggregate. Nevertheless, the deterrence bene-
fits might still outweigh the punitive costs of punishing them. For pun-
ishing them might deter people generally from performing criminal acts
that would violate the rights of others. As a consequence, punishing them
might prevent the violation of the rights of others. If violating someone's
rights would be extremely bad, then preventing the violation of someone's
rights would be extremely good. Hence, punishing criminal actors with
defenses might have the extremely good deterrence effect of preventing
people from violating the rights of others. So the deterrence benefits of
8o. This sense of value is employed in the standard formulation of act-consequential-
ism. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism I-2 (rev. ed. 1994).
81. I presuppose here that everyone is vividly aware of the things whose value is being
assessed. On a more precise restatement of this necessary condition on goodness, some-
thing is good only if everyone would be warranted for agent-neutral reasons in desiring
that it obtain if she were vividly aware of what it is like. Parallel restatements are available
for the following necessary conditions on badness.
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punishing them might be extremely high. Thus, the deterrence benefits
might outweigh the punitive costs of punishing them even if the latter
would be extremely high.
In the final analysis, punishing criminal actors with full defenses would
have significant costs, which might even be extremely high. In particular,
punishing them would result in significant punitive costs and costs of in-
security. However, punishing them might also have significant benefits,
which also might be extremely high. In particular, punishing them might
result in significant deterrence benefits. Thus, it is epistemically indeter-
minate whether the overall costs would outweigh the overall benefits of
punishing them. There is no robust reason to believe one way or the other.
So the value requirement does not explain the mitigating effects of full de-
fenses on a criminal actor's liability to punishment.
Parallel claims hold with respect to partial defenses. Punishing criminal
actors with partial defenses to an unmitigated degree would also have sig-
nificant additional costs, such as punitive costs and costs of insecurity.
However, punishing them to an unmitigated degree might also have sig-
nificant additional benefits, such as deterrence benefits. Thus, it is epis-
temically indeterminate whether the net benefit of punishing them to an
unmitigated degree would be lower than the net benefit of punishing
them to a mitigated degree. So the value requirement also does not explain
the mitigating effects of partial defenses on a criminal actor's liability to
punishment.
VI. THE DESERT REQUIREMENT
Compared to the value requirement, the desert requirement seems a much
more promising basis on which to explain the mitigating effects of de-
fenses on a criminal actor's liability to punishment. Intuitively, a criminal
actor with a full defense deserves no punishment, and more generally, a
criminal actor with a partial defense deserves to be punished only to a mit-
igated degree. This intuition, though, stands in need of justification. As we
have noted, it is not clear why criminal actors with full defenses deserve
no punishment given that criminal actors without them deserve some.
More generally, it is not clear why criminal actors with partial defenses de-
serve to be punished only to a mitigated degree given that criminal actors
without them deserve to be punished to an unmitigated degree. To explain
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these mitigating effects, I will consider theories of punitive desert that
might provide a prima facie plausible basis on which to explain them. I
will focus primarily on whether the theories can explain the mitigating ef-
fects of full defenses. If a theory does not explain them, then it does not
explain the mitigating effects of partial defenses either. If a theory does ex-
plain them, we will consider whether it also provides a more general ex-
planation of the mitigating effects of partial defenses. Ultimately, I argue
that my restorative signaling theory of punitive desert best explains the
mitigating effects of both full and partial defenses.
A. A Fairness Theory
A fairness theory might state the following necessary condition of punitive
desert: a criminal actor deserves to be punished for her act only if she had
a fair opportunity to avoid performing it. If a criminal actor has a defense
for her act, then she lacked a fair opportunity to avoid performing it. So
criminal actors with defenses do not deserve to be punished.
To illustrate, consider a defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. If a
criminal actor has such a defense, she did not believe her act had the prop-
erties that made it a criminal act. So she could not have been motivated
to avoid performing the act by those properties. And she could not have
been deterred from performing the act by any threat to punish her for per-
forming such an act under its description as a criminal act. As a conse-
quence, she lacked a fair opportunity to avoid performing it. Thus, she
does not deserve to be punished for it.
For another illustration, consider duress. In a standard case, a criminal
actor with a duress defense knew she would have suffered serious harm un-
less she performed her act. Given the serious harm she would have suf-
fered if she had avoided performing her act, she lacked a fair opportunity
to avoid performing it. So she does not deserve to be punished for it.
In response, the fairness theory is open to at least two objections. First,
the theory does not identify a necessary condition of defenses. A criminal
actor might have a defense even if she had a fair opportunity to avoid per-
forming her act. To illustrate, consider a criminal actor with a defense of
consent or defense of others and who knew the state did not recognize
such considerations as defenses. She could have known that her act was a
criminal one punishable by the state, and she might have known that she
could have avoided the act without suffering serious harm as a result. So
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she could have had a fair opportunity to avoid performing the act even
though she performed it with a defense of consent or defense of others.
Thus, the theory is limited in its explanatory power. At best, it could only
explain the mitigating effects of a subset of defenses.
Second, the theory does not identify a necessary condition of punitive
desert. A criminal actor might deserve to be punished for her act even if she
lacked a fair opportunity to avoid performing it. To illustrate, consider a case
involving a "counterfactual intervenor."8 2 Suppose I perform a criminal act
with no defenses. Suppose also that throughout the process of my perform-
ing it, a bystander secretly observed me ready to intervene whenever I might
have expressed any reluctance to perform the act. If I had expressed such re-
luctance, the bystander would have threatened to harm me seriously unless
I performed the act. In this case, I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid per-
forming it. For if I had avoided performing it, I would have suffered serious
harm. Nevertheless, I still deserve to be punished for the act.
B. A Second Fairness Theory
A second fairness theory might concede the objections to the first. But it
might state a revised necessary condition of punitive desert, and try to ex-
plain the mitigating effects of only a subset of defenses. According to the
revised condition, a criminal actor deserves to be punished for her act
only if (a) she disrespected the rights of others in performing it and (b)
she had a fair opportunity to avoid disrespecting the rights of others in
82. I borrow this term from John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and
Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility 29-30 (i998) and Copp, supra note 54, at 268.
As they use the term, a counterfactual intervenor is the potentially intervening mechanism
in any Frankfurt-style counterexample to the principle of alternate possibilities. According
to the principle, someone is blameworthy for performing an act only if she could have
done otherwise. In other words, someone is not blameworthy for performing an act if she
literally could not have done otherwise. Although I am not directly engaging this princi-
ple here, my counterexamples to the fairness theories of punitive desert are similar in form
to a Frankfurt-style counterexample to this principle. I set aside for further analysis,
though, the issue of whether this principle is sound and the issue of whether Frankfurt-
style counterexamples undermine it. For more discussion on these issues, see, e.g., Harry
Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. Phil. 829 (1969); Peter van
Inwagen, Ability and Responsibility, 87 Phil. Rev. 201 (978); and Moral Responsibility and
Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (David
Widerker & Michael McKenna eds., 2003).
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performing it. If a criminal actor has some range of defenses, then she does
not satisfy at least one part of the revised condition. Thus, criminal actors
with the relevant defenses do not deserve to be punished. The revised con-
dition of the second theory reflects the idea that ultimately criminal actors
deserve to be punished not for performing their acts per se, but rather for
the way they governed themselves in performing them.83 In particular,
they deserve to be punished for disrespecting the rights of others in per-
forming their acts.
The revised condition is not open to the counterexample to the first
theory. In that case, I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid performing the
criminal act. But I also disrespected the rights of others in performing it,
and I had a fair opportunity not to do so because I was free to perform the
act with only appropriate motives. For suppose I had expressed reluctance
to perform the act, and the bystander had intervened, threatening to harm
me seriously unless I performed it. Then I would have been free to per-
form the act solely in order to avoid the threatened harm; this motivation
would have been consistent with my performing the act with an appro-
priate regard for the rights of others and so with no disrespect for the
rights of others. So the revised condition does not unacceptably entail that
I do not deserve to be punished for performing the act.
In response, the second theory does not identify a necessary condition
of punitive desert. A criminal actor might deserve to be punished for her
act even if she lacked a fair opportunity to avoid disrespecting the rights
of others in performing it. To illustrate, consider another case involving a
counterfactual intervenor. Suppose again that I perform a criminal act
with no defenses. So I disrespected the rights of others in performing it.
Suppose also that throughout the process of my performing the act, a by-
stander secretly observed me ready to intervene whenever I might have ex-
pressed any reluctance to perform it. If I had expressed such reluctance,
the bystander would have injected into me a mind altering drug that
would have diminished my capacity to respond appropriately to the moral
reasons against violating the rights of others. As a consequence of the
drug, I would have performed the act, and I would have disrespected the
rights of others in performing it. In this case, I lacked a fair opportunity
to avoid not only performing the act, but also disrespecting the rights of
83. See Scanlon, supra note i, at 268-69.
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others in performing it. For if I had tried to avoid performing the act, I
would have been injected with a drug that would have caused me not only
to perform it, but also to disrespect the rights of others in performing it.
Nevertheless, I still deserve to be punished for the act.
C. A Third Fairness Theory
A third fairness theory might concede the objections to the first two. But
it might state another necessary condition of punitive desert and again try
to explain the mitigating effects of only a subset of defenses. According to
the condition, a criminal actor deserves to be punished for her act only if
she had a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for it. If a criminal ac-
tor has some range of defenses, and the state were to punish her for the
act, then she would not have had a fair opportunity to avoid being pun-
ished for it. Thus, criminal actors with the relevant defenses do not de-
serve to be punished.
The revised condition might not be open to the two previous coun-
terexamples in which I perform a criminal act with no defenses. In the first
case, suppose the state punishes me for performing the criminal act under
conditions in which the state recognizes a defense of duress as a mitigat-
ing factor. Then I had a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for the
act. For if I had tried not to perform the act, the bystander would have put
me under duress. And if I had performed the act under duress, I would
have had a duress defense for it, and the state would not have punished
me for it. In the second case, suppose the state punishes me for perform-
ing the criminal act under conditions in which the state recognizes a de-
fense of intoxication as a mitigating factor. Then I had a fair opportunity
to avoid being punished for the act. For if I had tried not to perform the
act, the bystander would have caused me to become intoxicated by inject-
ing the drug into me. And if I had performed the act while intoxicated, I
would have had an intoxication defense for it, and the state would not
have punished me for it. So in neither case would the revised condition
unacceptably entail that I do not deserve to be punished for the act.
In response, there might be significant costs to the state's adopting or
not adopting the revised condition as a constraint on the conditions un-
der which it punishes criminal actors. On the one hand, if the state were
not to adopt the constraint, it would restrict people's ability to plan on
making choices that would safeguard them from being punished. So as we
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have discussed, people might incur additional costs of insecurity in re-
sponse to the possibility of being punished for performing criminal acts
with the relevant defenses. On the other hand, if the state were to adopt
the constraint, it would restrict people's ability to plan on making choices
that would safeguard them from being victims of criminal acts. Punishing
criminal actors with the relevant defenses would have a general deterrence
effect that would be absent under the constraint. If the state were not to
punish criminal actors with the relevant defenses, it would provide fewer
people with a fair opportunity to avoid being victims of criminal acts. So
as we have discussed, people might incur additional costs of insecurity in
response to their higher probability of being victims of criminal acts.
But whether or not the benefits would outweigh the costs of adopting
the revised condition as a constraint, it is not a necessary condition of
punitive desert. A criminal actor might deserve to be punished for her act
even if she lacked a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for it. To il-
lustrate, consider variants of the previous cases. In the first, suppose the
state punishes me for performing the criminal act under conditions in
which the state does not recognize a defense of duress as a mitigating fac-
tor. Then I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for it. For if
I had tried not to perform the act, the bystander would have put me un-
der duress. And if I had performed the act under duress, the state would
have punished me for it anyway. In the second case, suppose the state pun-
ishes me for performing the criminal act under conditions in which the
state does not recognize a defense of intoxication as a mitigating factor.
Then I also lacked a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for the act.
For if I had tried not to perform it, the bystander would have caused me
to become intoxicated by injecting the drug into me. And if I had per-
formed the act while intoxicated, the state would have punished me for it
anyway. So in both cases, the revised condition unacceptably entails that I
do not deserve to be punished for the act.
In clarification, there is something objectionable about the state in each
case. But what is objectionable is not the state's punishing me for my
criminal acts or imposing on me an undeserved punishment. Given that I
performed the acts with no defenses, I deserved to be punished for them
even though I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid being punished for them
because the state does not recognize the relevant defenses. Rather what is
objectionable is precisely the state's policy of not recognizing these de-
fenses as mitigating factors. The policy is objectionable because criminal
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actors with these defenses do not deserve to be punished. The claim,
though, that criminal actors with defenses do not deserve to be punished
is precisely the claim that stands in need of justification.
D. A Fourth Fairness Theory
A fourth fairness theory might state a related principle of punitive desert
drawing on the content of the previous fairness theories. According to the
fourth principle, a criminal actor deserves to be punished for her act only
if she believed that she had a fair opportunity to avoid (a) performing the
act, (b) disrespecting the rights of others in performing the act, or (c) being
punished for the act. If a criminal actor has some range of defenses, and
the state punishes her for the act, then she believed that she lacked a fair
opportunity to avoid the principle's three conditions. Therefore, criminal
actors with the relevant defenses do not deserve to be punished.
The fourth principle is not open to any of the previous counterexamples.
In those cases, I performed the criminal act unaware of the counterfactual
intervenor. I did not believe there was a bystander who would have put me
under duress or injected a drug into me if I had expressed any reluctance to
perform the act. Hence, in each of the previous cases, I believed that I had
a fair opportunity to avoid (a) performing the criminal act, (b) disrespecting
the rights of others in performing it, and (c) being punished for it. Thus, the
fourth principle does not unacceptably entail that I do not deserve to be
punished for the criminal act.
In response, the fourth principle is also not a sound necessary condi-
tion of punitive desert. A criminal actor might deserve to be punished
even if she believed that she lacked a fair opportunity to avoid all the con-
ditions specified in the fourth principle. To illustrate, consider another
variant of our previous cases involving a counterfactual intervenor.
Suppose I am a misanthrope, and I go on a crime spree, committing ten
crimes in succession, one immediately after the other. I commit each
crime merely to cause others harm. Before I commit the fifth crime,
though, I notice a bystander. I know that if I show any reluctance to per-
form the fifth criminal act, the bystander will inject a drug into me that will
cause me not only to perform the criminal act, but also to disrespect the
rights of others in performing it. I also know that the state does not recog-
nize an intoxication defense, and the state will inevitably punish me for
performing the fifth criminal act. I choose to perform the fifth criminal
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act, however, merely to cause others harm and with no regard for the
rights of others. My beliefs about the bystander were motivationally inert,
as evidenced by the fact that I committed several similar crimes immedi-
ately before and after the fifth one outside the gaze of the bystander. Even
if I had been unaware of the bystander's presence, I would have been mo-
tivated to perform the fifth criminal act just as strongly as I was actually
motivated to perform it. As a consequence, I have no defense for the fifth
criminal act. I deserve to be punished for the act even though I believed
that I lacked a fair opportunity to avoid (a) performing it, (b) disrespect-
ing the rights of others in performing it, and (c) being punished for it.
In the final analysis, the fairness theories and their potential variants are
problematic for at least two reasons. First, it is doubtful that any fair op-
portunity of avoidance principle is a necessary condition of punitive
desert. Such principles seem open to counterexamples involving counter-
factual intervenors or nonstandard punitive policies involving strict liabil-
ity. So it is doubtful that such principles could explain why criminal actors
with any full defenses deserve no punishment. Second, even if such a prin-
ciple is a necessary condition of punitive desert, its explanatory power
would likely be limited. As we have seen, it is doubtful that such princi-
ples could explain why criminal actors with some full defenses do not de-
serve to be punished. For criminal actors with some full defenses, such as
consent and defense of others, seem capable of having a fair opportunity
to avoid any relevant consequence. It is also doubtful that such principles
could explain why criminal actors with mere partial defenses deserve to be
punished only to a mitigated degree. Criminal actors with some partial de-
fenses might have only a partially unfair opportunity to avoid some rele-
vant consequence. But it is not clear how such degrees of unfairness could
explain why they deserve to be punished only to a mitigated degree.
E. An Expressive Theory
An expressive theory might point out that punishing someone expresses an
attitude of moral blame toward her.M Such an attitude might be resentment
or indignation. Given the expressive aspect of punishment, an expressive
84. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and
Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 98 (970).
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theory might state the following necessary condition of punitive desert: a
criminal actor deserves a punishment only if the punishment would not
express an unwarranted attitude of moral blame toward her. So a criminal
actor deserves a punishment only if the punishment would not express too
much blame toward her. Punishing criminal actors with full defenses
would express too much blame toward them because punishing them
would express some blame toward them, and they are not at all blame-
worthy. Thus, they do not deserve to be punished. More generally, pun-
ishing criminal actors with partial defenses to an unmitigated degree
would express too much blame toward them because punishing them to
an unmitigated degree would express an unmitigated degree of blame to-
ward them, and they are blameworthy only to a mitigated degree. Hence,
they do not deserve to be punished to an unmitigated degree.
In response, the theory is open to at least two objections. First, it
merely assumes that criminal actors with full defenses are not at all blame-
worthy, and those with partial defenses are blameworthy only to a miti-
gated degree. But these claims stand in need of justification. Given that
criminal actors without full defenses are blameworthy to some degree, it
is not clear why those with full defenses are not also blameworthy to some
degree. And given that criminal actors without partial defenses are blame-
worthy to an unmitigated degree, it is not clear why those without partial
defenses are not also blameworthy to an unmitigated degree. Because the
theory provides no justification for these assumptions, it is unpersuasive.
Second, the theory is circular. On a standard view, attitudes of moral
blame consist at least partly in certain demands.85 To feel an attitude of
moral blame toward someone is to make or feel certain demands on her.
So to express an attitude of moral blame toward someone is to express cer-
tain demands on her. One demand that is constitutive of an attitude of
moral blame is the demand to undertake a punishment or, more precisely,
the burdens constitutive of a punishment. 6 Punishing someone expresses
85. See Darwall, supra note 26, at 17; Strawson, supra note ii, at 14-15, 21-22; Watson,
supra note iI, at 121, 126-28.
86. Attitudes of moral blame are sentiments of justice. See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism
87-107 (Oxford 1998). As such, they are a subset of all attitudes of moral disapproval. I do
not claim that a demand to undertake a punishment is constitutive of all the latter. I only
claim that such a demand is constitutive of moral blame. See id. at 93, 95 (claiming that at-
titudes of moral blame as sentiments of justice involve both a desire to punish their objects
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an attitude of moral blame toward her by expressing its constitutive de-
mand on her to undertake the punishment. So to claim that a punishment
expresses an unwarranted attitude of moral blame toward someone is to
claim that the punishment expresses an unwarranted demand on her to un-
dertake the punishment. And to claim that a demand on someone to under-
take a punishment is unwarranted presupposes that she does not deserve
the punishment. 7 As a consequence, the expressive theory is circular in
virtue of the fact that it presupposes what it aims to explain. 8
To clarify, consider criminal actors with full defenses. The theory tries
to explain why they do not deserve any punishment on the assumption
that any punishment would express too much blame toward them. But to
claim that any punishment would express too much blame toward them
is to claim that any punishment would express an unwarranted demand
on them to undertake the punishment. And to claim that a demand on
them to undertake any punishment would be unwarranted presupposes
that they do not deserve any punishment. The claim, though, that they do
not deserve any punishment is precisely the claim to be explained.
Consider now criminal actors with partial defenses. The theory tries to ex-
plain why they do not deserve an unmitigated punishment on the as-
sumption that such a punishment would express too much blame toward
them. But to claim that an unmitigated punishment would express too
much blame toward them is to claim that such a punishment would ex-
press an unwarranted demand on them to undertake the punishment.
and the judgment that their objects can be properly punished); cf. Thomas Baldwin,
Punishment, Communication, and Resentment, in Punishment and Political Theory 124,
i28, 130, 132 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999) (claiming that resenting someone involves the
judgment that she should be punished); Joseph Butler, Sermon VIII: Upon Resentment,
in The Works of Joseph Butler 41 (W.E. Gladstone ed., 1896) (suggesting that attitudes of
resentment and indignation toward someone involve a desire that she be punished).
87. The considerations that determine whether others are warranted in demanding
someone to undertake a punishment are narrower than the considerations that determine
whether others have most reason to desire to demand her to undertake the punishment.
The relevant considerations are the ones that determine whether she is obligated to others
to undertake the punishment. Cf. Copp, supra note 54, at 271-75; Darwall, supra note 26,
at 96-99. For related discussion on the distinction between the considerations that make
an attitude warranted, fitting, or rational and the considerations that make an attitude de-
sirable, see the works cited in supra note 26.
88. Cf. Baldwin, supra note 86, at 130, 132 (expounding a similar circularity objection
to attempts to justify punishing someone on the grounds that punishing her would express
a warranted attitude of resentment toward her).
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And to claim that a demand on them to undertake an unmitigated pun-
ishment would be unwarranted presupposes that they do not deserve such
a punishment. The claim, though, that they do not deserve an unmiti-
gated punishment is precisely the claim to be explained. Because the the-
ory presupposes the claims it aims to explain, it is circular.
F. A Restorative Signaling Theory
My restorative signaling theory, RS, assumes that someone deserves a pun-
ishment for an act if and only if her undertaking the punishment is nec-
essary to fulfill an obligation she incurs from performing the act. 89 If the
latter condition obtains, she deserves the punishment for three related rea-
sons. First, she is obligated to undertake the punishment. For in general,
if someone has an obligation to do something, she has a derivative obliga-
tion to undertake the means necessary to her doing it.90 Second, she is ob-
ligated to consent to undertake the punishment. 9' In general, if someone
89. For a full defense of RS, see my A Restorative Signaling Theory of Punitive Desert
(2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the
University of Michigan Philosophy Department).
90. This is a transmission principle concerning obligations. For similar transmission
principles concerning "oughts," see Mark Schroeder, Means-end Coherence, Stringency,
and Subjective Reasons, Phil. Stud. (forthcoming).
9I. Since RS is grounded in a principle of consent, it could be considered a consent
based theory of punitive desert. However, RS is not grounded in a principle of actual con-
sent. It does not assume that criminals deserve to be punished because they actually con-
sent to undertake a punishment. Compare C.S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of
Punishment, 12 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 289, 297-300 (1983) (arguing that criminals actually con-
sent to forfeit their moral rights against being punished for their crimes because in com-
mitting them, they knowingly forfeit their legal rights against being punished for them),
with Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 178
(1986) (criticizing Nino's consent based theory of punitive desert) and T.M. Scanlon,
Punishment and the Rule of Law, in The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political
Philosophy 219 (2003) (same). Even if criminals do not actually consent to undertake a
punishment, RS assumes they deserve to be punished because they are obligated to con-
sent to undertake a punishment. On one interpretation, the fact that criminals are obli-
gated to consent to undertake a punishment makes punishing them even against their will
consistent with Kant's categorical imperative to treat others as ends in themselves and
never as mere means to an end. See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals 4:433 (Mary Gregor ed., 1997); cf. Derek Parfit, Climbing the Mountain chs. 4-5
(forthcoming) (discussing interpretations of this formulation of Kant's categorical imper-
ative and its relation to various principles of consent).
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is obligated to undertake something or must undertake something to ful-
fill an obligation, then she has an obligation to consent to undertake it.
Third, she would be unjustly enriched by not undertaking the punish-
ment. 2 For by not undertaking the punishment, she would not only vio-
late her obligation to others, but also obtain a benefit from the violation
consisting in her freedom from the burdens necessary to fulfill the obliga-
tion. In general, if someone obtains a benefit from violating an obligation
to others, the benefit constitutes an unjust enrichment. Each of these re-
lated claims entails that she has no right to be free from the punishment."
So if she refuses to undertake the punishment voluntarily, the state would
not violate her rights by imposing the punishment on her against her will.
Given its basic principle, RS explains why criminals without defenses
deserve to be punished by explaining why they must undertake a punish-
ment to fulfill an obligation they incur from committing their crimes.
92. Insofar as an unjust enrichment constitutes an unfair advantage, RS could be con-
sidered a type of unfair advantage theory of punitive desert. For examples of such theories,
see Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in Theories of Punishment 76, 79 (Stanley
E. Grupp ed., 97); Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 217,
228-29 0973); George Sher, Desert 69-9o 0987); Richard Dagger, Playing Fair with
Punishment, 103 Ethics 473 (1993). Unlike these particular theories, though, RS does not
assume that criminals obtain a benefit from committing their crimes. They might not.
Rather RS assumes that criminals stand to obtain a benefit from violating an obligation
they incur from committing their crimes. Relatedly, RS does not assume that the wrong
for which criminals deserve to be punished consists in their obtaining an unfair advantage
or an unjust enrichment. Rather RS assumes that the wrong consists in their disrespecting
the rights of others. Also unlike these particular theories, RS can account for the propor-
tionality of punitive desert, as I argue below. See Richard Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve
Punishment?, 79 J. Phil. 193, 209-10 (1982) (criticizing other unfair advantage theories of
punitive desert on the grounds that they cannot account for its proportionality); David
Dolinko, Some Thoughts about Retributivism, ot Ethics 537, 545-49 (i99) (same); Matt
Matravers, Justice and Punishment: The Rationale of Coercion 45-72 (2ooo) (same).
93. I take this point to be basic for the purposes of this paper. In general, if someone is
obligated to undertake a burden or is obligated to consent to undertake it or would be un-
justly enriched by not undertaking it, she has no right to be free from it. In other words,
under any one of these conditions, she has no claim or entitlement to be free from the bur-
den. Cf. Mill, supra note 86, at 93 (stating that "Duty is a thing which may be exacted from
a person, as one exacts a debt .... Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may
militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself ... would not be entitled to
complain."); Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, in Rights, Justice, and the Bounds
of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy 130 (1980) (analyzing rights in terms of claims).
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According to RS, a person has an obligation of trust not to undermine the
conditions that are necessary for others' being justified in believing that she
is not disposed to commit crimes. Call such conditions "conditions of
trust." A person's obligation of trust is grounded in the fact that she would
standardly cause others to incur at least three costs of insecurity by under-
mining conditions of trust.9 4 First, if someone undermines them, others ra-
tionally must invest in costly precautionary measures to protect themselves
from her. For example, others might need to engage in costly surveillance
schemes to reduce their interactions with her and to employ costly protec-
tive services when interacting with her is unavoidable. Second, if someone
undermines conditions of trust, others rationally must forgo pursuing
some personally and socially valuable activities that would invariably leave
them too vulnerable to her. Third, if someone undermines conditions of
trust, others will rationally experience fear in response to their higher sub-
jective probability of her committing crimes against them. To avoid im-
posing such costs on others, a person has not only the obligation of trust,
but also an obligation of restoration. According to the obligation of restora-
tion, if someone undermines conditions of trust, she is obligated to restore
those conditions as quickly as is reasonably possible by demonstrating to
others that she is no longer disposed to commit crimes. She must restore
them as quickly as is reasonably possible because the longer she takes to re-
store them the longer others must incur the costs of insecurity.95
When someone commits a crime with no defenses, she undermines con-
ditions of trust.96 Her crime is strong evidence that she is disposed to commit
crimes; therefore, others are not justified in believing otherwise.97 So she is
94. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 13 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge 1996) (noting
the costs of insecurity someone rationally must incur in response to being justified in be-
lieving that others are disposed to engage in acts of aggression).
95. To be concise, I leave the quickness condition implicit in my following discussion
of the obligation of restoration.
96. David Hoekema and Susan Dimock also point out that criminals undermine con-
ditions of trust by committing their crimes. See Susan Dimock, Retributivism and Trust,
16 Law & Phil. 37 (i997); David A. Hoekema, Trust and Obey: Toward a New Theory of
Punishment, 25 Isr. L. Rev. 332 (1991).
97. Some crimes under some descriptions are literally unrepeatable, like matricide or pat-
ricide. But even these undermine conditions of trust because even these are strong evidence
that their perpetrator is disposed to commit crimes. For when someone commits a crime
without a defense, her specific crime is strong evidence that she is disposed to commit
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obligated to restore the conditions of trust she undermined by committing
her crime. Given her obligation of restoration, she is obligated to under-
take any means that are necessary to fulfill it. Hence, she is obligated to
undertake any burdens that are necessary to fulfill it. So assuming she
must undertake certain burdens to fulfill her obligation of restoration, the
state may impose them on her as a punishment against her will without vi-
olating her rights. According to the main principle of RS, a criminal deserves
a punishment for her crime that is no more severe than the burdens she
must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs from com-
mitting her crime. In other words, a criminal deserves to be punished for her
crime no more severely than the burdens she is obligated to undertake to re-
store the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.98
A criminal with no defenses must in fact undertake some burdens to
fulfill her obligation of restoration. By committing her crime, she under-
mined conditions of trust by providing others with strong evidence that
she is disposed to commit crimes. To fulfill her obligation of restoration,
a broader range of crimes comparable in seriousness. Two findings, among others, support
the broader inference.
First, there is a high rate of recidivism among criminals: a high percentage of criminals
commit multiple crimes at different times. See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin,
U.S. Dep't Just., Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (among 300,000 prisoners released in i5 U.S. states, 67.5%
were rearrested for a new offense, and 46.9% were reconvicted for a new crime within
3 years of their release); Michael R. Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of
Crime 107-o8, 177, 230-3I, 253 (990) (noting the high stability of criminals' dispositions
to commit crimes, and citing numerous research studies in support).
Second, there is a high rate of versatility or, in other words, a low rate of specialization
among criminals: a high percentage of criminals commit multiple types of crimes. See, e.g.,
Gottfredson & Hirschi, supra, at 91-94, 256, 266 (discussing the high rate of versatility
among criminals, and noting numerous research studies in support); Chester L. Britt,
Versatility, in The Generality of Deviance 173 (Travis Hirschi & Michael R. Gottfredson
eds., 1994) (same); Leonore M.J. Simon, Do Criminal Offenders Specialize in Crime
Types?, 6 Applied & Preventive Psychol. 35 (1997) (same, noting the high rate of versatil-
ity even among white collar criminals, sex offenders, and those who commit crimes of do-
mestic violence).
98. As a corollary, a criminal does not deserve a punishment for her crime that is more
severe than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation of restoration she in-
curs from committing her crime. In other words, a criminal does not deserve to be pun-
ished for her crime more severely than the burdens she is obligated to undertake to restore
the conditions of trust she undermined by committing her crime.
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she must annul such evidence by providing others with strong counter-
vailing evidence that she is no longer disposed to commit crimes. To pro-
vide others with such countervailing evidence, she must demonstrate that
she has a good will." Assuming she has a good will, she has a stable dis-
position not to commit crimes even under conditions in which she could
commit them without fear of being detected and punished.
To demonstrate that she has a good will, a criminal must demonstrate
that she has a stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the
moral reasons against committing crimes. Hence, she must demonstrate
that she has a stable disposition to be appropriately motivated by the
moral reasons against violating the rights of others. To demonstrate this,
she must demonstrate that she has a stable disposition to care highly about
the interests of others.'00 Such a stable disposition to care is strong evi-
dence of a stable disposition to respect the rights of others. For the moral
reasons against violating the rights of others are grounded in the interests
of others. To demonstrate that she has such a disposition to care, she must
demonstrate that she has acted with a sufficiently high degree of benevo-
lence for a sufficiently long time after committing her crime.'"' For the
fact that someone acts with a sufficiently high degree of benevolence for
99. As Annette Baier states, when we trust others, we are confident that they have a
good will toward us; therefore, "reasonable trust will require grounds for such confidence
in another's good will .. " Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 Ethics 230, 235 (1986).
IOO. Two points of clarification are in order. First, the attitude of care at issue is one of
respectful care. It is an attitude of caring about others only in ways that respect them as
persons. See Darwall, supra note 26, at 126-30 (distinguishing an attitude of respect from
an attitude of mere care). Second, I mean only a thin sense of care, which might consist in
an austere attitude of other regard. In this sense, for someone to care about the interests of
others just is for her to place weight on their interests in deliberating about what to do. In
this sense, for someone to care highly about the interests of others just is for her to weight
their interests to a sufficiently high degree relative to her own in deliberating about what
to do. This thin sense of care does not have some of the implications of a thicker sense. For
example, in the thin sense, someone might care highly about the interests of others with-
out being disposed to grieve when they are harmed or rejoice when they are benefited. Cf.
Lawrence A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality 12-15, 146-49 (198o) (discussing a
thicker sense of care and other altruistic emotions in which these attitudes do involve dis-
positions to respond toward their objects with particular feelings).
io. I refer here only to a thin sense of benevolence that consists in caring about the in-
terests of others in the same thin sense I spell out in supra note too. In this sense, a high
degree of benevolence involves weighting the interests of others to a sufficiently high de-
gree relative to one's own in deliberating about what to do.
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a sufficiently long time is strong evidence that she has a stable disposition
to care highly about the interests of others.' °2 To demonstrate that she has
acted with such benevolence, she must sacrifice some of her sufficiently
important personal interests for a sufficiently long time for the sake of
benefiting others. To make such a sacrifice for others, the criminal must
standardly engage in labor-intensive community service, and she must
standardly do so while incapacitated in some form to mitigate the costs
of insecurity that others rationally must incur during the interim.' °3
Thus, to fulfill her obligation of restoration, a criminal must undertake
some burdens.'04
At this point, we have shown that RS explains why criminals with no
defenses deserve some punishment for their crimes. RS also explains how
much they deserve to be punished. According to RS, the absolute severity
of the most severe punishment that a criminal deserves for her crime cor-
responds to the absolute severity of the burdens she must undertake to ful-
fill her obligation of restoration.' 5 In general, the absolute severity of such
burdens does correspond to the absolute severity of the most severe pun-
ishment that a criminal with no defenses seems to deserve for her crime.
To illustrate, consider someone who commits a moderately serious
crime with no defenses and, thus, disrespects the rights of others to a
moderately bad degree in committing it. Her crime is strong evidence that
she has a moderately bad disposition to commit crimes. Thus, her crime is
strong evidence that she has a moderately bad disposition to disrespect the
102. See, e.g., Michael Bacharach & Diego Gambetta, Trust in Signs, in Trust in Society
148, 154 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2ooi) (noting benevolence as a trust-warranting property).
103. For this reason, punishments under RS should ideally take the form of labor-
intensive community service performed under reasonable conditions of incapacitation.
104. Like other trust building or maintaining processes, the process of a criminal's ful-
filling her obligation of restoration has a "multi-layered inferential structure." Id. at 162. In
addition to undertaking the required burdens, other steps might also be necessary to re-
store the conditions of trust, such as apologizing for the crime and compensating any vic-
tims. The criminal also might need to undergo some form of therapy and take steps to
eliminate aspects of her situation that pressure her to commit crimes, such as unemploy-
ment and corrupting social influences. Much will depend on the specifics of the case.
Because these other steps are not necessarily burdensome for the criminal, they need not
be part of her punishment.
IoS. See the Appendix for determining the precise severity of the burdens required to
fulfill one's obligation of restoration.
HeinOnline  -- 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 272 2009
A NEW SYSTEMATIC EXPLANATION I 273
rights of others. So her crime is strong evidence that there is a moderately
bad deficiency in the degree to which she cares about others. On reflec-
tion, to annul this evidence and demonstrate that she has a stable dis-
position to care highly about others, she must demonstrate that she has
acted with a moderately high degree of benevolence for a moderately
long time after committing her crime. To demonstrate this, she must
sacrifice some of her moderately important personal interests for a mod-
erately long time for the sake of benefiting others. So she must under-
take no more than a moderately severe burden to restore the conditions
of trust she undermined by committing her crime. Hence, she deserves
no more than a moderately severe punishment for her crime. By parity
of reasoning, a mildly serious criminal with no defenses deserves no
more than a mildly severe punishment for her crime, and an extremely
serious criminal with no defenses deserves an extremely severe punish-
ment for hers.
Given RS's explanation of why and how much criminals with no de-
fenses deserve to be punished, we can see its explanation of how much
criminal actors presumably deserve to be punished for their acts.
According to RS, a criminal actor deserves to be punished for her act no
more severely than the burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obliga-
tion of restoration she incurs from performing her act. When someone
performs a criminal act, there is a presumption that she committed a par-
ticularly serious crime in performing it. Thus, she presumably disrespected
the rights of others to a particularly bad degree in performing it. As a con-
sequence, she presumably has a particularly bad disposition to commit
crimes. So she is presumably disposed to flout a relevant class of the moral
reasons against violating the rights of others. And so presumably there is a
particularly bad deficiency in the degree to which she cares about the in-
terests of others. Thus, there is a presumption that by performing her act,
she undermined conditions of trust to a particularly bad degree. On the
assumption that she has the capacity to restore those conditions of trust,
she is presumably obligated to do so. Assuming she has an obligation of
restoration, there is a presumption that she must undertake certain bur-
dens to fulfill it. Hence, she presumably deserves to be punished for her
act as severely as those burdens, but no more severely. Given RS's expla-
nation of how much criminal actors presumably deserve to be punished
for their acts, we can now see how it explains the mitigating effects of the
main types of defenses.
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1. Type 1 Defenses
Consider type i defenses, which mitigate how badly a criminal actor dis-
respected the rights of others in performing her act. Suppose a criminal ac-
tor has a full type i defense. Then she did not commit a crime in
performing her act. Although she might have violated the rights of others,
she did not disrespect their rights in performing the act. For example, she
might have been caused to perform the act against her will by mere force;
she might not have believed her act would have the type of consequences
that make it a criminal act; or she might have been appropriately moti-
vated to perform the act by her belief that particular considerations ob-
tained which (a) entailed that her performing it would not violate the
rights of others or (b) provided her with most reason to perform it. As a
consequence, the act is not strong evidence that she is disposed to commit
crimes. Thus, she did not undermine any conditions of trust by perform-
ing the act. So she does not incur an obligation of restoration from per-
forming it. Therefore, she does not deserve to be punished for the act.
To illustrate, consider a criminal actor with a full type i defense of
duress. Suppose she commits a theft in response to another's threat to kill
her unless she commits it. In this case, her theft is not a crime. Although
she might have violated the rights of the theft victim, she did not disre-
spect his rights because her reasons in favor of committing the theft out-
weighed her reasons against.' 6 As a consequence, her theft is not strong
evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes. So she did not undermine
any conditions of trust by committing the theft, and so she does not in-
cur an obligation of restoration from committing it. Therefore, she does
not deserve to be punished for committing the theft.
Suppose a criminal actor has a mere partial type i defense. Then al-
though she committed a crime in performing her act, the crime was not
as serious as presumed. Thus, the defense mitigates the seriousness of the
crime she committed in performing the act. It mitigates how badly she
io6. I assume a person can have agent-relative reasons to care about her own interests
out of proportion to the interests of others. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 78, at 171-75;
Scheffler, supra note 8o, at 20; Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in
Utilitarianism: For and Against 75, io8-i8 U.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973).
So I assume someone might have most reason not to resist a threat under duress even
though the indirect effects of not resisting the threat would make doing so non-optimific
for the reasons we discussed earlier.
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disrespected the rights of others in performing the act. So the defense mit-
igates the badness of the disposition to commit crimes that others are jus-
tified in believing she has on the basis of her act. And so the defense
mitigates the deficiency in the degree to which she cares about others that
they are justified in believing she has on the basis of her act. In sum, the
defense mitigates how badly she undermined conditions of trust by per-
forming the act. As a consequence, the defense mitigates the severity of
burdens she must undertake to restore the conditions of trust she under-
mined by performing the act. So it mitigates the severity of burdens she
must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration. Therefore, the de-
fense mitigates how much she deserves to be punished for the act.
2. Type 2 Defenses
Consider type 2 defenses, which block the otherwise justified inference
from the fact that someone performed a criminal act to her having the pre-
sumed disposition to commit crimes at the time of assessment. Suppose a
criminal actor has a full type 2 defense. Then she might have committed
a crime in performing her act. But given the defense, the act is not strong
evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes at the time of assessment.
For example, she might have performed the act under conditions that
would standardly cause a temporary radical distortion in an agent's system
of normative self-governance. Thus, she did not undermine any conditions
of trust at the time of assessment by performing her act. So at the time of
assessment, she does not incur an obligation of restoration from perform-
ing the act. Therefore, she does not deserve to be punished for the act.
To illustrate, consider a criminal actor with a full defense of somnam-
bulism. Suppose she intentionally killed others while she was sleepwalk-
ing. 7 In this case, she did commit a very serious crime in killing them.
She disrespected their rights very badly in doing so. Nevertheless, her
killing them is not strong evidence that she is disposed to commit crimes
at the time of assessment, when she is awake. For she killed the others un-
der conditions, namely a particular state of sleep, that would standardly
cause a temporary radical distortion in an agent's system of normative
107. For an actual case involving homicidal somnambulism, see The Queen v. Parks,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 871 (Canada).
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self-governance."°8 Thus, she did not undermine any conditions of trust at
the time of assessment by killing the others. So at the time of assessment,
she does not incur an obligation of restoration from killing them. Hence,
she does not deserve to be punished for the crime.
Suppose a criminal actor has a mere partial type 2 defense. Then she
might have committed a crime in performing the act, and the crime might
have been as serious as presumed. She might have disrespected the rights
of others to the presumed degree in performing the act. Nevertheless, the
defense still mitigates the badness of the disposition to commit crimes that
others are justified in believing she has at the time of assessment on the ba-
sis of her act. Thus, the defense mitigates how badly she undermined con-
ditions of trust at the time of assessment by performing her act. So it
mitigates the severity of burdens she must undertake to restore the condi-
tions of trust she undermined by performing the act. And so it mitigates
the severity of burdens she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of
restoration at the time of assessment. Therefore, the defense mitigates how
much she deserves to be punished for the act.
3. Type 3 Defenses
Consider type 3 defenses, which are considerations that undermine a crim-
inal actor's capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant class of moral
reasons at the time of assessment. Suppose a criminal actor has a full type
3 defense. Then she might have committed a crime in performing her act,
and the act might be strong evidence that she is disposed to commit
crimes at the time of assessment. So the act might be strong evidence that
she is disposed to flout a class of moral reasons against violating the rights
of others. Thus, she might have undermined conditions of trust by per-
forming her act.
Nevertheless, even if the criminal actor did undermine conditions of
trust, she is not obligated to restore them. For a person is obligated to do
something only if others can fairly demand her to do it.'" And others can-
not fairly demand someone to do something that she lacks the capacity to
io8. Cf. Rosalind Cartwright, Sleepwalking Violence: A Sleep Disorder, a Legal
Dilemma, and a Psychological Challenge, 161 Am. J. Psychiatry 1149, 1150 (2004) (describ-
ing the state of sleep in which sleepwalking violence standardly occurs).
IO9. Cf. Copp, supra note 54, at 271-75; Darwall, supra note z6, at 96-99.
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do."' So a person is obligated to do something only if she has the capac-
ity to do it."' If a criminal actor has a full type 3 defense for her act, she
lacks the capacity to respond appropriately to any of the relevant moral
reasons that she is presumably disposed to flout. Hence, she lacks the ca-
pacity to restore any of the conditions of trust she undermined by per-
forming her act. Assuming others know she lacks the capacity to respond
appropriately to the relevant moral reasons, there is nothing she could do
to justify others in believing that she is disposed to respond appropriately
to them. Because she lacks the capacity to restore any of the conditions of
trust she undermined by performing her act, she is not obligated to restore
any of them. As a consequence, she does not incur an obligation of
restoration from performing her act. Therefore, she does not deserve to be
punished for the act.
To illustrate, suppose someone commits a theft with a full type 3 de-
fense of kleptomania, where kleptomania is an incapacity to respond ap-
propriately to the moral reasons against committing theft. In this case, her
theft is a crime. She disrespected the rights of others in committing it.
Given that she committed the theft as a kleptomaniac, her theft is strong
evidence only that she is disposed to commit crimes of theft.' 2 So her theft
is strong evidence only that she is disposed to flout the moral reasons
against committing theft. Thus, she did undermine some conditions of
trust by committing her crime.
Nevertheless, she is not obligated to restore those conditions of trust to
any degree because she does not have the capacity to do so. To restore them
to any degree, she must have the capacity to demonstrate to others that she
is disposed to respond appropriately to the moral reasons against commit-
ting theft. To have this capacity, she must have the capacity to respond ap-
propriately to such reasons. But as a kleptomaniac, she lacks this capacity.
Assuming others know she lacks the capacity to respond appropriately to
tio. See Copp, supra note 54, at 271-75.
iii. This is similar to the more general principle that someone ought to do something
only if she can do it. See id.; Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 6:38o (Mary
Gregor ed., 1996) (stating that "he must judge that he can do what the law tells him un-
conditionally that he ought to do").
112. For this reason, kleptomania is also a partial type 2 defense to a crime of theft. In the
standard case, a theft is strong evidence of a broader disposition to commit a broader range
of crimes. See supra note 97 (pointing out the high degree of versatility among criminals).
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the moral reasons against committing theft, there is nothing she could do
to justify their believing that she is disposed to respond appropriately to
them. As a consequence, she does not incur an obligation of restoration
from committing her theft. Therefore, she does not deserve to be pun-
ished for the theft. '13
Suppose a criminal actor has a mere partial type 3 defense. Then she
might have committed a crime in performing her act, and the crime might
have been as serious as presumed. The act might justify others in believ-
ing that she has the presumed disposition to commit crimes. So the act
might justify others in believing that she is disposed to flout the presumed
class of moral reasons against violating the rights of others. Thus, she
might have undermined conditions of trust to the presumed degree by
performing her act.
However, even if she did undermine conditions of trust to the pre-
sumed degree, she is not obligated to restore these conditions fully because
she lacks the capacity to do so. To restore them fully, she must demon-
strate that she is disposed to respond appropriately to all the relevant
moral reasons she is presumably disposed to flout. But she lacks the ca-
pacity to demonstrate this because she lacks the capacity to respond ap-
propriately to all the relevant moral reasons in virtue of having a partial
type 3 defense. Assuming others know she lacks this capacity, there is
nothing she could do to justify their believing that she is disposed to re-
spond appropriately to all the relevant moral reasons.
Because she has the capacity to respond appropriately only to a subset
of the relevant moral reasons, she has the capacity to demonstrate that she
is disposed to respond appropriately only to a subset of them. So she is ob-
ligated to demonstrate that she is disposed to respond appropriately only
to a subset of the relevant moral reasons. Hence, the defense mitigates the
degree to which she is obligated to restore the conditions of trust she un-
dermined by performing her act. Under her obligation of restoration, she
113. Although the kleptomaniac does not incur an obligation of restoration from com-
mitting her theft, she might still incur an obligation to compensate her victims for their
losses, and if her disposition to commit theft is sufficiently bad, she might incur an obli-
gation to incapacitate herself by undertaking a civil commitment. But neither requiring
her to compensate her victims nor incapacitating her would constitute a punishment per
se. For neither would express an attitude of moral blame toward her and neither would be
necessarily or intentionally burdensome for her.
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is obligated to restore only to a partial degree the conditions of trust she
undermined by performing her act. As a consequence, the defense miti-
gates the severity of burdens she must undertake to fulfill the obligation
of restoration she incurs from performing her act. Thus, the defense mit-
igates how much she deserves to be punished for the act.
4. Type 4 Defenses
Given its account of the three main types of defenses, RS generates a more
general fourth type of defense. Type 4 defenses are considerations that mit-
igate the severity of burdens a criminal actor must undertake to fulfill the
obligation of restoration she incurs from performing her act. If a criminal
actor has a full type 4 defense, she need not undertake any burdens to ful-
fill the obligation. So she does not deserve any punishment for her act. If a
criminal actor has a partial type 4 defense, she might need to undertake
some burdens to fulfill the obligation, but the required burdens are not as
severe as presumed. So the defense mitigates how much she deserves to be
punished for her act. Although all type i, type 2, and type 3 defenses are a
subset of type 4 ones, some considerations can be type 4 defenses without
falling under the extension of the other types. Consider three plausible can-
didates: childhood, brainwashing, and a rotten social background.
Consider childhood. In some cases, childhood provides a type i defense.
Children are sometimes incapable of understanding the effects of their acts
on others. When they perform criminal acts, they sometimes do not believe
their acts have the properties that make them criminal ones."4 In other cases,
childhood provides a type 2 but not a type i defense. Unlike adults, children
often do not have settled dispositions. As they grow, their dispositions con-
stantly change, often in radical ways. So the mere fact that a child was dis-
posed to disrespect the rights of others when she performed a criminal act is
sometimes not strong evidence that she is similarly disposed later at the time
of assessment."5 In other cases, childhood provides a type 3 but not a type 2
or type i defense. Children sometimes lack the capacity to respond appro-
priately to the moral reasons against violating the rights of others."6 In other
cases, though, childhood arguably provides a type 4 defense but not one of
114. See Scanlon, supra note ii, at 280.
115. See id. at 28o-81.
116. See id. at 28o.
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the other types. Relative to adults, the dispositions of children are standardly
much more malleable in the sense that they are much more responsive to the
demands of authority figures. So even if children do undermine conditions
of trust to the presumed degree, and even if they have the capacity to re-
spond appropriately to the moral reasons against violating the rights of oth-
ers, they can standardly go a long way toward restoring those conditions
merely by undertaking a demanding but nonpunitive course in moral edu-
cation. The same cannot be said for adults in the standard case. Hence, the
fact that a criminal is a child mitigates the severity of burdens she must un-
dertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration.
Consider brainwashing, which is a means of changing a person's beliefs or
the norms she accepts. Brainwashing is coercive persuasion standardly carried
out through means of manipulation and domination." 7 When brainwashing
is successful, it causes a radical change in the victim's system of normative
self-governance. In particular, brainwashing can cause someone who accepts
norms against committing crimes to accept norms requiring her to commit
them. Now suppose such a person commits a crime because she has been
brainwashed into accepting a norm requiring her to commit it."8 In such a
case, she might not have a type i defense because she might have disrespected
the rights of others to the presumed degree in committing the crime. She
might not have a type 2 defense because her crime might be strong evidence
that she has the presumed disposition to commit crimes at the time of assess-
ment. More strongly, she might actually have such a disposition at the time
of assessment. She might not have a type 3 defense because she might still
117. Brainwashing a victim often involves several elements, such as (I) isolating her; (2)
exercising total control over her environment, especially the information she receives and
what is communicated to her; (3) physically debilitating her by, for example, providing her
with an inadequate diet, insufficient sleep, and poor sanitation; (4) requiring her to per-
form repetitive tasks, like copying written material; (5) manipulating her feelings of guilt
and anxiety; (6) threatening to annihilate her unless she accepts the beliefs or norms of her
apparently all-powerful captors; (7) degrading her for not accepting them; (8) subjecting
her to peer pressure; and (9) requiring her to act contrary to the beliefs or norms that her
captors want her to reject. See Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind:
Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63
Minn. L. Rev. I, 2-3 (1978).
II8. For cases that arguably involve such brainwashing, see the cases of American pris-
oners of war during the Korean conflict at U.S. v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452 (1954); U.S. v.
Fleming, i9 C.M.R. 438 (1954); U.S. v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 46 (1955). See also the case of
Patricia Hearst at U.S. v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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have the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons against vio-
lating the rights of others. Thus, she might have undermined conditions of
trust by committing her crime, and she might incur an obligation to restore
those conditions at the time of assessment. Nevertheless, she still might have
a type 4 defense for her crime. When brainwashed people are freed from their
captors and undergo a rigorous but non-punitive psychiatric process of de-
programming or deconditioning, they are highly likely to reject the changes
that were induced in them from the brainwashing. "9 So when a criminal
commits a crime as a result of brainwashing, she can go a long way toward
restoring conditions of trust by merely separating from her captors and un-
dergoing non-punitive treatment.'20 Hence, the fact that a criminal was
brainwashed can mitigate the severity of burdens she must undertake to ful-
fill her obligation of restoration.'2
Consider a rotten social background.'22 Someone with such a back-
ground is standardly born into an environment involving, among other
things, extreme poverty, an abundance of corrupting influences, a scarcity
of positive influences, and a perceived lack of viable opportunities for es-
caping the environment. Such a background can place a high degree of pres-
sure on someone to commit crimes, especially property crimes.'23 Suppose
119. See Delgado, supra note 117, at 9, 9 n.40, 30-32; Robert Jay Lifton, Thought Reform
and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China 86-I51 (196I).
120. To obtain such separation and treatment, the brainwashed criminal will likely re-
quire the assistance of the state.
121. In addition to providing a type 4 defense, brainwashing might also provide a type
2 or type 3 defense. A criminal actor could have a type 2 defense of brainwashing if she per-
formed her act as result of brainwashing, and she obtained treatment before the time of as-
sessment. She could have a type 3 defense of brainwashing if her brainwashing undermined
her capacity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons against violating the rights of
others at the time of assessment. Although brainwashing can be a partial defense, I leave it
an open question whether it can be a full defense.
122. U.S. v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (us-
ing the phrase "rotten social background").
123. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev.
385 (1976); Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 Law & Inequality 9 (985).
Although a rotten social background can exert pressure on someone to commit crimes, it
should be noted that only a minority of those with such a background actually succumb
to such pressure and commit crimes. See Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare
Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1247, 1259 (1976).
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someone commits a crime, such as theft, in response to pressures from her
rotten social background. Although she might lack a type I, type 2, or type 3
defense for the crime, she still might have a type 4 defense for it. Even if
she undermined conditions of trust by committing the crime, and has the
capacity to respond appropriately to the moral reasons against violating
the rights of others, she can restore the conditions to a significant degree
by merely pursuing non-criminal opportunities to live under better social
conditions. Such opportunities include, among others, opportunities for
meaningful employment, opportunities for severing personal ties with
corrupting influences, and opportunities to establish personal ties with
positive influences.'24 By pursuing such opportunities, the criminal would
free herself from many of the factors in her rotten social background that
pressured her to commit crimes. Thus, the fact that a criminal has a rot-
ten social background can mitigate the severity of burdens she must un-
dertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration.'
In the final analysis, RS explains why defenses mitigate how much
criminal actors deserve to be punished for their acts by explaining why de-
fenses mitigate the severity of burdens they must undertake to fulfill the
obligation of restoration they incur from performing their acts. In some
cases, criminal actors with defenses do not incur an obligation of restora-
tion from performing their acts. They might not have undermined any
conditions of trust by performing their acts, and even if they did under-
mine conditions of trust, they might lack the capacity to restore them. In
other cases, criminal actors with defenses do incur an obligation of restora-
tion, but their defenses nevertheless mitigate the severity of burdens they
must undertake to fulfill the obligation.
124. Obtaining such opportunities would likely require the assistance of the state.
Although their provision might be costly for the state, such costs are acceptable given that
their deprivation arguably constitutes an injustice.
125. In addition to providing a type 4 defense, a rotten social background might also
provide a type 2 or type 3 defense. A criminal actor could have a type 2 defense of a rot-
ten social background if she performed her act against such a background, and she pur-
sues non-criminal opportunities to live under better social conditions before the time of
assessment. She could have a type 3 defense of a rotten social background if her back-
ground undermined her relevant capacities at the time of assessment. Although a rotten
social background can be a partial defense, I leave it an open question whether it can be
a full one.
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VII. BLAMEWORTHINESS
So far we have focused on how RS explains the mitigating effects of de-
fenses on punitive desert. In light of this explanation, we can see how RS
explains their mitigating effects on blameworthiness. As we have noted,
attitudes of moral blame contain certain demands, such as the demand to
undertake a punishment, that are constitutive of the attitudes themselves.
According to RS, an attitude of moral blame contains a demand to restore
conditions of trust and a demand to undertake certain burdens to restore
those conditions. When others blame a criminal actor for her act, they
presuppose that she undermined certain conditions of trust by perform-
ing the act, and they demand her to restore those conditions by under-
taking certain burdens. The higher the severity of burdens they demand
her to undertake, the more they blame her for the act. The lower the sever-
ity of burdens, the less they blame her for the act.
According to RS, the degree to which a criminal actor is blameworthy
for her act corresponds to the severity of burdens that others are warranted
in demanding her to undertake to restore the conditions of trust she un-
dermined by performing the act. The higher the severity of burdens they
are warranted in demanding her to undertake, the more she is blamewor-
thy for the act. The lower the severity of burdens, the less she is blame-
worthy for the act. According to RS, others are warranted in demanding
a criminal actor to undertake certain burdens to restore the conditions of
trust she undermined by performing her act if and only if she must un-
dertake those burdens to fulfill the obligation of restoration she incurs
from performing the act. Thus, by explaining the mitigating effects of de-
fenses on the severity of burdens that criminal actors must undertake to
fulfill their obligation of restoration, RS also explains their mitigating ef-
fects on how much criminal actors are blameworthy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
RS has important implications for the nature and strength of the state's rea-
sons to recognize defenses as mitigating factors in its punitive policies.
There are two possible reasons why the state might recognize them. On the
one hand, the state might do so on the basis of considerations of value or
efficiency. In particular, it might do so because the costs would outweigh
the benefits of punishing criminal actors with defenses to an unmitigated
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degree. On the other hand, the state might do so on the basis of consid-
erations of justice. By showing that defenses mitigate how much criminal
actors deserve to be punished, RS shows that their mitigating effects are
indeed ultimately grounded in considerations of justice. So even if it
would be costly or inefficient to punish criminal actors with defenses only
to a mitigated degree, the state is still obligated to do so as a means to re-
specting their rights.
IX. APPENDIX
According to RS, a criminal deserves to be punished no more severely than
the burdens she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration. To
fulfill it, she must send others a restorative signal, which is a directly ob-
servable property that is strong evidence of her acting with the required
degree of benevolence for the required time after committing her crime. 
2 6
By definition, a restorative signal is credible; it justifies others in believing
that the criminal has acted with the required degree of benevolence for the
required time. To be credible and not excessively burdensome, a restora-
tive signal must satisfy two conditions.
According to "the incentive compatibility condition, " 127 a restorative
signal cannot be too costly for criminals who are benevolent to the required
degree for the required time. So the all-in costs of a restorative signal
must not be greater than its all-in benefits for criminals who are benev-
olent to the required degree for the required time. The all-in benefits of
a restorative signal for a criminal consist in all the expected conse-
quences of her sending it that she desires to obtain; its all-in costs for
her consist in all the expected consequences of her sending it that she
126. A signal is a directly observable property that is strong evidence of its bearer's pos-
sessing another property that is not directly observable. The concept of a signal has inter-
disciplinary application. See, e.g., A. Michael Spence, Market Signaling (974)
(economics); Amotz & Avishag Zahavi, The Handicap Principle (Naama Zahavi-Ely &
Melvin Patrick Ely trans., 1997) (biology); Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life (rev. ed. I959) (sociology); Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner &
Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 122-58 (1994) (law). For an elementary
game-theoretic analysis of signaling, see Avinash Dixit & Susan Skeath, Games of Strategy
263-310 (2d ed. 2004). For an application of signaling theory specifically to trust, see
Bacharach & Gambetta, supra note 1O2.
127. Bacharach & Gambetta, supra note 102, at 16o.
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desires not to obtain.'28 According to "the non-pooling condition, ' '29 a
restorative signal must be too costly for criminals who are not benevolent
to the required degree for the required time. So the all-in costs of a restora-
tive signal must be greater than its all-in benefits for criminals who are not
benevolent to the required degree for the required time.'3 ° Thus, how bur-
densome a restorative signal must be depends on how benevolently a crim-
inal must act and for how long to fulfill her obligation of restoration.
Suppose a criminal must act with a particular degree of benevolence, B,
for a particular time, t, to fulfill her obligation of restoration. Suppose a per-
son who is B cares equally about promoting a particular amount, S, of her
own interests and promoting a minimal interest, M, of others. B's benevo-
lence factor, f, equals S/M, where S>>M.'' So a person who is B is willing
to sacrifice S of her own interests solely for the sake of promoting M inter-
ests of others.'3 2 To demonstrate that she has acted with B for t, she must sac-
rifice tS of her own interests solely for the sake of promoting tM interests of
128. I take the concept of all-in benefits and costs from Bacharach & Gambetta, supra
note 102, at 176-77. They distinguish between a person's "all-in payoffs" and her "raw pay-
offs." A person's raw payoffs from an act consist only in its expected consequences that she
cares about and that affect her well-being understood in the narrowest sense. Roughly
speaking, her raw payoffs from the act consist only in its expected consequences that she
cares about for her own sake. Her all-in payoffs from the act consist in both her raw pay-
offs from it and its expected consequences that she cares about but that do not contribute
to her well-being understood in the narrowest sense. Roughly speaking, her all-in payoffs
from the act consist in both her raw payoffs from it and its expected consequences that she
cares about for the sake of something other than herself, such as other persons. Ultimately,
a person's all-in payoffs determine which acts she performs.
129. Bacharach & Gambetta, supra note Io2, at 16o.
13o. A restorative signal need not satisfy the non-pooling condition for literally all crim-
inals: some anomalous exceptions are consistent with its being sufficiently credible. Thus,
a restorative signal can have a "semi-sorting equilibrium." Bacharach & Gambetta, supra
note 1O2, at 16o.
131. Other things being equal, people are not obligated to act with such a high degree
of benevolence. Indeed, other things being equal, acting with such a high degree of benev-
olence would constitute a rationally deficient form of self-abnegation. But when a person
commits a crime, other things are not equal. The criminal incurs an obligation of restora-
tion, and she must act with such a high degree of benevolence to fulfill it.
132. In clarification, two conditions determine the required absolute magnitudes of S
and M. First, the absolute magnitude of the ratio S/M must be sufficiently high. Second,
the absolute magnitude of the difference between S and M must also be sufficiently high.
A criminal's sacrificing S of her own interests solely for the sake of promoting M interests
of others will demonstrate the required degree of benevolence only if S/M and S-M are
both sufficiently high.
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others.13 Hence, a burden with a severity of -tS is the least severe burden
she must undertake to demonstrate that she has acted with B for t. For this
is the least severe burden that would satisfy the incentive compatibility and
non-pooling conditions on the credibility of a restorative signal.
First, the burden would satisfy the incentive compatibility condition be-
cause for a criminal who is B for t, sacrificing tS of her own interests solely
for the sake of promoting tM interests of others would not be too costly. For
her, the all-in costs of doing so would not be greater than the all-in benefits
of doing so; they would be equal. The all-in benefits to her would equal the
degree to which she cares about the interests she would promote in others:
ftM. The all-in costs to her would equal the degree to which she cares about
the interests she would sacrifice in herself: tS. Because f=S/M, ftM=tS.
Second, the burden would satisfy the non-pooling condition because
for a criminal who is not B for t, sacrificing tS of her own interests solely
for the sake of promoting tM interests of others would be too costly. For
her, the all-in costs of doing so would be greater than the all-in benefits of
doing so. To consider a simple case, suppose for t she is benevolent to a
lesser degree B" whose benevolence factor, f", is such that f"<f. The all-in
benefits to her would equal f"tM. The all-in costs to her would equal tS.
Because f=S/M and f"<f, tS>f"tM.
Third, any less severe burden would violate the non-pooling condition
because for a criminal who is not B for t, sacrificing any less than tS of her
own interests solely for the sake of promoting tM interests of others would
not be too costly. For her, the all-in costs of doing so would be less than
or equal to the all-in benefits of doing so. Suppose the lesser sacrifice is
tS-E. Suppose also that for t she is benevolent to a lesser degree B" whose
benevolence factor, f", is such that (tS-E)/tM<__f"<f. The all-in benefits to
her would equal f'tM. The all-in costs to her would equal tS-E. Because
f">(tS-E)/tM, tS-E<_f"tM.
On a related note, the badness of the deficiency in the degree to which a criminal cares
about others depends on two similar conditions. Suppose the criminal is willing to harm M
interests of others to promote S of her own interests. The badness of her deficiency depends
on the absolute magnitude of both S/M and S-M. The lower they are the worse the deficiency.
133. The units oft consist in the time required for the criminal to sacrifice S of her own
interests for the sake of promoting M interests of others. So t corresponds to the number
of benevolent acts she must undertake to fulfill her obligation of restoration. As a corol-
lary, t corresponds to the number of times the criminal must sacrifice S of her own inter-
ests to promote M interests of others.
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